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[Tihe transformation of international business law signifies more than just an incremental
normative change; it signifies a quite radical revision in the very prism through which we
view transnational deals and disputes)
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article will attempt to ferret out factors that may lead to unintended
contractual liability for American business persons involved in international
transactions. The focus will be on two distinct issues. First, this Article will
examine the presumption of enforceability placed on certain types of business
correspondence by foreign legal systems. Legal hybrids, such as comfort
instruments,' are more likely to result in contractual liability in civil law
systems than in the Anglo-American legal system. Comfort instruments can
be found in both the private and public domains. In the private domain, they
can be found in the validity agreement in asset-based financing,3 letters of
understanding or intent in business purchases, 4 and restrictive agreements
used in purchase negotiations.5 In the public arena, governmental agencies
have resorted to comfort instruments either to provide guidance to private
applicants or to deal with daunting delays due to administrative manpower
shortages. Corson v. Rhuddlan Burough Council,6 for example, involved the
1. Kenneth C. Randall & John E. Norris, A New Paradigm for International Business Transactions,
71 WASH. U. L.Q. 599, 624 (1993).
2. These instruments are generally given in letter form. They are found in almost all areas of law,
business, and finance. See ROBERT A. THOMPSON, REAL ESTATE OPINION LETrER PRACTICE (1993)
(discussing use of attorney comfort or attorney opinion letters); Jeffrey J. Gilbert, Comfort Letters: A
Banker's View, 64 J. COM. BANK LENDING 48 (1982) (discussing use of comfort letters in commercial
lending). Parties engaged in business and finance often use these instruments to communicate. A comfort
letter is given by one party to another in a negotiation, or by a third party to the negotiations (attorney,
parent company, accountant), in order to encourage or "comfort" one of the parties to enter into the
prospective transaction or relationship. See Ren6 Sacasas & Don Wiesner, Comfort Letters: 77e Legal and
Business Implications, 104 BANKING L.J. 313, 313 (1987) ("[Clomfort letter[s] [seek] to assure the lender
[or a party to a transaction] without the writer intending to commit itself as a surety or guarantor.").
3. In order to validate a company's inventory or accounts receivable, a bank or factoring institution
often requires a company officer or director to warrant that the records are accurate. See ASSET-BASED
FINANCING: A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE § 26 app. at 26-200 (Howard Ruda ed., 1992) (reproducing form
indicating that this is industry practice).
4. Based on my experience, a typical letter of intent might begin: "This is in reference to our
conversations with respect to the possible purchase." See generally David N. Goldsweig, Documentation
of Present Intent and Confidentiality, in NEGOTIATING AND STRUCTURING INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
TRANSACTIONS 521 (Shelly P. Banttram & David N. Goldsweig eds., 1991).
5. A restrictive agreement is generally given in the form of a letter in which "a seller agrees not to
negotiate with third parties for a fixed period of time, while the buyer investigates the seller's business."
CHARLES SCHARF ET AL., ACQUISITIONS, MERGERS, SALES, BUYOUTS & TAKEOVERS 365 (4th ed. 1991).
6. 59 P.P. & C.R. 185 (Eng. C.A. 1990).
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use of a comfort letter by a local municipality regarding its intent to renew a
land lease. More recently, the European Directorate IV7 has used the comfort
letter in the area of trade practices. Despite the lack of a legislative mandate
to create such a device, the Directorate has informally used it to reassure
companies contemplating a merger or an acquisition. I
The second issue of concern is the U.S. ratification of the Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG),9 and whether it may
result in unexpected liability for the business person with only a working
knowledge of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). A 1995 U.S. court of
appeals case noted that analogous case law interpreting the UCC "may also
inform a court where the language of the relevant CISG provisions tracks that
of the UCC."' 0 The court concluded, however, that such "case law is not
per se applicable.""1 Article 7(1) of the CISG asserts that courts'
interpretations of the Convention should be "informed by its international
character and ... the need to promote uniformity in its application." 2 Thus
foreign court decisions that construe the Convention's provisions should play
a greater role in its interpretation than analogous UCC case law. The
continuing globalization of U.S. business interests will force the legal and
business communities to focus on the legal intricacies of international business
transactions.' 3 As Dennis Tallon has noted, a factor "of prime importance
in our times is the internationalization of commercial law." 14 These
7. For an explanation of the Directorate's responsibilities in the area of competition, see 52
HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND para. 19.123 (4th ed. 1986).
8. See generally C. S. KERSE, EEC ANTITRUST PROCEDURE (2d ed. 1988) (indicating that companies
contemplating merger or acquisition often request informal, nonbinding comfort letter from Directorate
stating that it does not expect to challenge transaction under EC Competition Law).
9. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, U.N.
Doe. A/CONF.97/18, Annex I, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 668 [hereinafter CISG]. The CISG was
incorporated into the law of the United States in January 1988. See ALBERT H. KRITZER, GUIDE TO
PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS app. 1 (1994) (providing list of countries adhering to CISG). As of the
date of this Article, forty-six countries, including many of the United States's major trading partners, have
ratified the Convention. See id. "Among the forty-five nations adopting the CISG are Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Canada, Chile, China, France, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland." John
E. Murray, Jr., Different Laws Might Apply to Foreign Buys Under the United Nations Covention for the
International Sale of Goods, PURCHASING MAG., Oct. 19, 1995, at 30. Russia also has adopted the
Convention. See KRITZER, supra, at app. 1 (indicating that Russia ratified CISG on Aug. 16, 1990, and
that it entered into force on Sept. 1, 1991). The United Kingdom, however, is a notable exception.
10. Delchi Carrier SpA v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024, 1028 (2d Cir. 1995).
11. Id. (quoting Orbisphere Corp. v. United States, 726 F. Supp. 1344, 1355 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1989)).
12. CISG, supra note 9, art. 7, para. 1. The drafters of the CISG hoped that it would facilitate free
trade by harmonizing contract rules in the commercial sale of goods:
If everyone could agree on a single, reasonable set of rules, that is, one that strongly
resembled the one with which the speaker is most familiar, then the babel of divergent national
legal systems would break down, and a coherent and predictable framework for business
transactions would emerge. This strategy has much to recommend it since many legal rules,
and particular contract rules, are largely conventional.
Arthur Rosett, Critical Reflections on the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 265, 283 (1984).
13. The passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement and the Uruguay Round of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade are two important examples of the globalization of commercial
transactions.
14. Dennis Tallon, Civil Law & Commercial Law, in 8 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COMPARATIVE LAW § 2-18 (Konrad Zweigert ed., 1993).
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developments will require the successful international entrepreneur to
familiarize herself with the CISG and with the contract law of the foreign
country in which she plans to do business.
II. CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY FOR COMFORT INSTRUMENTS
No written contract is ever complete; even the most carefully drafted document rests on
volumes of assumptions that cannot be explicitly expressed. 15
A search of English case law from 1989 reveals twenty-seven cases
dealing with liability based upon representations made in business
cbrrespondence. 16 Generally considered to be nonlegal business assurances,
these letters of commerce are being increasingly scrutinized for possible
promissory or reliance-based liabilities.
Generally, the objective of comfort instruments is credit value or
exchange enhancement. A seller or a lender wants assurance as to certain
factors that she determines to be important in contemplating a transaction. A
refusal of a formal guaranty or surety17 by another party may result in a
termination of the negotiation. Comfort letters are therefore issued as a
compromise in order to salvage the transaction. They are hypocritical
instruments intended to serve two masters. While wanting to avoid liability for
nonperformance, the writer hopes the receiver of the writing will enter into
a legally binding transaction. Consequently, many letters of assurance are
characterized by an internal repugnancy or inconsistency. They contain
language that could induce reliance while they attempt to disclaim any liability
as a guaranty.
The classic discussion of the doctrine of repugnancy can be found in the
1923 English case Rose & Frank Co. v. Crompton Bros."8 The letter at issue
contained both promissorial language and the language of disclaimer. The
court utilized a "dominant language" test to determine if legal liability should
be ascribed to the assurance language.' 9 It compared the strength of the
assurance language with the disclaimer language and concluded that the letter
was neither intended nor should have been relied upon as a contractually
enforceable document. The court focused on the clause in the letter claiming
that it was not a "formal or legal agreement" and asserting that the document
was rather "only a definite expression and record of the purpose and intention
of the three parties concerned to which they each honourably pledge[d]
15. Rosett, supra note 12, at 287.
16. See Larry A. DiMatteo & Ren6 Sacasas, Credit and Value Comfort Instruments: Crossing the
Line from Assurance to Legally Significant Reliance and Toward a Theory of Enforceability, 47 BAYLOR
L. REV. 357, 358 n.2 (1995); see, e.g., Walford v. Miles [1992] 2 App. Cas. 128 (appeal taken from
C.A.) (concerning issuance of comfort letter by parent company to bank contemplating financing
commitment to parent's subsidiary).
17. Surety or suretyship encompasses an entire range of instruments of which the guaranty is but
one. Other surety instruments include the letter of credit, performance bonds, and fidelity bonds. The body
of law on suretyship generally holds that such instruments are legally enforceable obligations. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP §§ 62-70 (1996); ARTHUR STEARNS, THE LAw OF SURETYSHIP
§ 1.2 (James L. Elder ed., 5th ed. 1951).
18. [1923] 2 K.B. 261 (Eng. C.A.).
19. See id. at 293.
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themselves." 2 The court held that "an honourable pledge"21 implies only
a moral and not a legal obligation. 22
Ultimately, the value of the assurance depends upon its degree of detail.
The use of detailed assurance language may lead a court to characterize such
letters as guaranty substitutes and thereby impose liability upon the issuing
party. The greater the detail of the representations and the stronger the
assurance language, the greater the likelihood of reliance by the receiving
party. When such a promise crosses the line from simple assurance to
justifiable reliance, then a binding contract is created.?3 As more cases are
brought to bar involving comfort instruments, it is increasingly likely that
courts will find them legally binding.
Historically, the civil law provides an analogue for the evolution of a
presumption of enforceability for previously unenforceable instruments of
commerce. The centuries old lex mercatoria helped "codify" day-to-day uses
and practices into customary law. Commentators have recognized the
prevalence and binding nature of such merchant-generated law: "[The] law
merchant presents a universal character thanks [in part] to the cohesiveness
of the milieu in which it developed."24 The increased use and recognition of
comfort instruments in the commercial world may provide the milieu for a
regime of enforceability.
The next two sections of this Article explore factors that will greatly
influence the development of any such regime. Section II.A analyzes the
differing presumptions of enforceability found in the Anglo-American and
civil law legal systems. It is followed by an analysis of common factors used
in making the enforceability decision.
A. Differing Presumptions of Enforceability
An estimated ninety-five percent of all comfort letters are issued by a
parent company to obtain financing for a subsidiary.' In Chemco Leasing
SpA v. Rediffusion Plc., Justice Staughton recalled Justice Vaisey's sardonic
definition of such letters as a "gentlemen's agreement ... which is not an
agreement, made between two persons neither of whom is a gentleman,
whereby each expects the other to be strictly bound without himself being
bound at all."
26
20. Id. at 287.
21. Id. at 283.
22. The American law equivalent to the "honourable pledge" has been articulated as follows: "[I]f
[the parties] manifest an intention that only a moral obligation is undertaken, the agreement is not
binding. .. ." JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 14 (1970).
23. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (1979) ("A promise which the promisor
should reasonably expect to induce action... and which does induce such action ... is binding if
injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise."). The problem of lack of consideration
where the letter issuer is a third-party to the transaction may be resolved by reliance's twin sister,
promissory estoppel.
24. Tallon, supra note 14, § 14, at 8.
25. See John Evans, British Court Warns Lenders Not To Rely on Letters of Comfort, AM. BANKER,
June 6, 1989, at 7.
26. Chemco Leasing SpA v. Rediffusion Pic. (Eng. Q.B. July 19, 1985) (LEXIS, Enggen Library,
Cases File), aff'd, (Eng. C.A. Dec. 11, 1986) (LEXIS, Enggen Library, Cases File).
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Although English and American courts have generally held these letters
to be nonguarantees, the potential for liability remains. The court in Heisler
v. Anglo-Dal, Ltd. ,27 for example, harkened back to the lex mercatoria when
it described the genesis of customary law:
[O]ne has to bear in mind that commercial men do not look at these things quite from the
lawyer's point of view .... [Although a lawyer would consider an instrument to be
worthless] a commercial man would regard the guarantee, perhaps furnished in the form of
[a] letter, as having some value as underlining, as it were, the promise that had been
undertaken.'
It is in this customary law of business that the law often creates new rules of
contractual liability.
The potential for liability may be even greater under civil law legal
systems. The civil law seems to place less weight upon the semantic labeling
of instruments when determining the existence of a legally enforceable
obligation.29 A brief comparative review of civil law and common law
jurisprudence illustrates the potential for liability for representations made in
letters of assurance.
1. Anglo-American Law
Commercial and legal practitioners in the Anglo-American system have
generally regarded comfort instruments as nonbinding instruments of
commerce. The court in K/S A/S Bani v. Korea Shipbuilding & Engineering
Corp.30 confirmed this view. A bank that had taken over a financially
distressed shipbuilding company sent comfort letters to the shipbuilder's
customers and creditors that expressed confidence that the shipbuilder would
meet its obligations in the future. Despite the letter's clear potential for
inducing reliance, the court held that such letters were nonbinding. The court
concluded that there was little doubt that the letters were "written in good
faith . . . . [They] can be treated as a source of comfort but no more than
that." 31 This conclusion, however, suggests that bad faith may be a basis of
liability. For example, what if the issuer had little intention of providing
future credit to the company or was privy to important information concerning
the troubled nature of the company?
32
The number of reported cases involving the enforceability of comfort
27. [1954] 2 All E.R. 770 (Eng. C.A.).
28. Id. at 772 (quoting Barker v. M'Andrew, 144 Eng. Rep. 643 (C.P. 1865)).
29. For a look at the reception and influence of Roman law upon English common law, see Thomas
weir, Contracts in Rome and England, 66 TuL. L. REV. 1615 (1992); John F. Winkler, Roman Law in
Anglo-Saxon England, 13 J. LEGAL HIST. 101 (1992); see also T. Plucknett, The Relations Between
Roman Law and English Common Law Down to the Sixteenth Century, 3 U. TORONTO L.J. 24 (1939). For
a brief review of the intermingling of common and civil law, see Luigi Moccia, English Law Attitudes to
the 'CivilLaw', 2 J. LEGAL HisT. 157, 164 (1981) ("[Olne must still mention the long-established judicial
practice of resorting to 'continental authorities' in cases of 'first impression' .... [E]vidence which may
be gathered suggests the existence of close relations between 'English law' ... and 'Continental law.'").
30. [1987] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 445, 455 (Eng. C.A.) (discussing comfort letter as ancillary issue to main
holding of case).
31. Id.
32. A cause of action in tort for fraud or misrepresentation may be possible in this type of situation.
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letters has been growing. Nowhere has the increase been more pronounced
than in the English courts. Many of these English cases have raised new
issues concerning the enforceability of comfort letters while also providing
guidance on how to avoid liability. A review of the case law shows that
although such instruments remain generally unenforceable, the outlines of a
jurisprudence of enforceability have begun to come into focus. For example,
the English case of Compagnie Generale D'Industrie et de Participations v.
Solori S.A.33 avoided the issue of comfort letter enforceability by holding
that the unsigned comfort letter failed to satisfy the statute of frauds.34
However, the case made clear that such instruments were not innately
unenforceable." The potential for contractual liability was further confirmed
by the 1986 case of Chemco Leasing SpA v. Rediffusion Plc.36 There, the
court made clear that assurances made by a parent company in a letter that it
would "undertake to take over the remaining liabilities" of its subsidiary were
fully enforceable legal promises.37
Some believed that the 1987 case of Kleinwort Benson, Ltd. v. Malaysia
Mining Corp.3" would become a watershed decision in favor of comfort letter
enforceability. 39 That belief, however, proved short-lived when the court of
appeal quickly reversed the lower court holding that the letter at issue was
binding.4" The proliferation of cases since Kleinwort Benson, however,
indicates that it was not a deathblow to the issue of liability.
An analysis of the lower court decision, therefore, is useful in predicting
a future jurisprudential basis for comfort instrument enforceability. Kleinwort
Benson confirmed that courts will no longer treat such instruments as per se
unenforceable. Instead, they will look to the specific language of each
instrument when making an enforceability determination. For example, the
letter in Kleinwort Benson confirmed the parent company's knowledge of a
loan to a subsidiary and assured the lender that it was its policy "to ensure
that the business of [the subsidiary was] at all times in a position to meet its
liabilities."41 Justice Hirst implied a binding obligation into the comfort letter
by interpreting the "policy to ensure" language as a "promise to ensure." The
court of appeal reversed, reasoning that the policy to ensure was a statement
of current policy; as such, it did not constitute a promise that the policy would
continue into the future.42
Despite its reversal, Justice Hirst's opinion renewed interest in the
33. (Eng. Q.B. June 18, 1984) (LEXIS, Enggen Library, Cases File).
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. (Eng. C.A. Dec. 11, 1986) (LEXIS, Enggen Library, Cases File).
37. Id.
38. [1988] 1 W.L.R. 799 (Q.B. 1987) [hereinafter Kleinwort 11.
39. See, e.g., B.J.D., Comment, A Very Comfortable Comfort Letter, 1988 LLOYD'S MAR. & COM.
L.Q. 290, 293-94.
40. See [1989] 1 W.L.R. 379 (Eng. C.A.) [hereinafter Kleinwort I1].
41. Kleinwort I [1988] 1 W.L.R. at 802.
42. The change of policy argument was exactly the argument that the parent company made to the
lower court: "[A]Ithough the policy referred to was our policy at that time and in light of the
circumstances then prevailing, no assurance was given that such policy would not be reviewed in the light
of changing circumstances." Id. at 801.
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potential for comfort letter enforceability, especially because the court of
appeal reversed on such narrow grounds. The court of appeal did not hold
comfort letters to be per se unenforceable. Instead, it held that the specific
language used in this case was not sufficient to find a legally binding
obligation. The potentially limited nature of the reversal became evident in a
1990 New Zealand decision.43 There, the court held that a reference to
future policy raised a letter to the level of a guaranty. The court reasoned that
"the wording of the present letter goes further than the mere declaration of
existing policy which led the Court [in Kleinwort Benson] to conclude that [the
issuer] was not bound by its letter of comfort."' In the court's view, the
operative language of enforceability concerned the issuer's policy that its
subsidiary would meet its obligations, and that the issuer would use its "'best
endeavors' to see that [the subsidiary] continue[d] to do so. "I The court
interpreted the phrase "best endeavors" to mean a future promise of a binding
nature.46
Taken together, Bank of New Zealand and Justice Hirst's opinion in
Kleinwort Benson question the soundness of the presumption that such
informal letters are unenforceable. Justice Hirst argues that the "onus of
proving that there [is] no such intention [to create legal relations] is on the
party who asserts that no legal effect is intended, and the onus is a heavy
one." 47 Bank of New Zealand seems to agree. Placing such a burden on the
writer of a comfort letter would be tantamount to creating a presumption of
enforceability.
A presumption against the drafter of an instrument has a long history in
English common law. The contra proferentem rule holds that "in the case of
ambiguity when all other rules of construction fail, the doubt is removed by
construing the document adversely to the [drafter]. "48 The key element of
ambiguity, however, is often found to be lacking by the courts when not
enforcing a comfort instrument against its writer. Thus, an
"arrangement . . .binding in honour" 49 and a "policy to ensure" 50 have
been held to be unambiguous statements of intent that do not create a legal
obligation.
Modern legal philosophy has provided justification for increasingly active
43. See Bank of New Zealand v. Ginivan [1991] 1 N.Z.L.R. 178 (C.A. 1990).
44. Id. at 180.
45. Id. at 179. But see British & Commonwealth Holdings Plc. v. Quadrex Holdings, Inc. (Eng.
Q.B. May 8, 1991) (LEXIS, Enggen Library, Cases File) (holding that use of phrase "reasonable
endeavors" is not sufficient to establish liability).
46. See Bank of New Zealand [1991] 1 N.Z.L.R. at 179.
47. Kleinwort I [1988] 1 W.L.R. at 803 (citing Edwards v. Skyways, Ltd. [1964] 1 W.L.R. 349,
355 (Eng. Q.B.)).
48. Letters of Responsibility Reports Delivered During the Meetings of Committee E-Commercial
Banking in Atlanta on 4th November 1977, 6 INT'L Bus. LAw. 288, 295, 301-02 (1978) [hereinafter
Letters of Responsibility] (statement of Adrian M.H. Smart). Because of this rule, Smart cautions that "it
behoves a parent company to be precise and unequivocal in the obligations it assumes." Id. at 302. The
principle of contra proferentem has a long history throughout English law. See, e.g., Glynn v. Margetson
[1893] App. Cas. 351 (appeal taken from Eng.) (construing carriage of goods contract clause against
drafter).
49. See, e.g., Rose & Frank Co. v. J.R. Crompton & Bros. [1923] 2 K.B. 261, 273 (Eng. C.A.).
50. Kleinwort 11 [1989] 1 W.L.R. at 393.
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judicial intervention in the finding of constructive agreements. In addition to
the contra proferentem rule, limiting principles such as good faith and fair
dealing may be brought to bear against the writer of letters used to persuade
another party to enter into a business transaction. 51 The development of the
broad concepts of good faith, unconscionability, and reliance or promissory
estoppel have given courts tremendous leeway to intervene in contractual and
quasi-contractual situations. Professor Macneil refers to these grounds for
enforceability as the "linking norms" of restitution, reliance, and
expectation.52 If one of the linking norms is present, or if an intent to be
bound can be inferred, an instrument should be held to be binding. Justice
Hirst, in Kleinwort Benson, enlisted the help of the reliance and intent pillars
of contractual enforceability. First, the lender in that case relied on the letter
in granting the loan. Second, the issuer acted pursuant to a formal
authorization of its board of directors, implying an intent regarding the
seriousness of the assurance. Furthermore, the court found that the strength
of the assurance language placed a burden on the issuer to state explicitly a
disclaimer of liability.
Since the decision in Kleinwort Benson, English case law has continued
to question the strength of the presumption of nonenforceability. For instance,
the court in Capital Landfill (Restoration), Ltd. v. William Stockier & Co.
53
applied a heightened level of scrutiny that belied the existence of a
presumption of nonenforceability:
The question comes down to whether this letter was intended simply as a comfort
letter. . . or whether it was intended by the parties as a legal document binding the
company strictly to its terms. These are questions that cry out to be clarified by oral
evidence, and [cannot be] based simply on the wording of this alleged undertaking.
The type of language and evidence that is most likely to result in a legally
binding obligation will be determined by legal evolution. The fact remains that
recipients of comfort letters often believe that they are within the contractual
domain. They continue to bring suit in the hope of persuading a court to find
such letters to be legally enforceable.
U.S. courts have rarely shown such a propensity to push the contractual
envelope to include traditional types of comfort instruments. Recent cases,
however, indicate that the possibility of liability remains. Following
Anglo-American common law, U.S. courts have tended to place great weight
upon the use or nonuse of contractual nomenclature. If a comfort letter issuer
avoids the operative words55 of contract or guaranty, then she will probably
51. See Robert Braucher, Interpretation and Legal Effect in the Second Restatement of Contracts,
81 COLUM. L. REV. 13, 16 (1981) ("Limiting principles include the duty of good faith [and] construction
against the draftsman.").
52. See IAN MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN CONTRACTUAL
RELATIONS 55 (1980). The seminal American work on the linking norm of reliance is Lon Fuller &
William Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 373 (1937); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1979).
53. (Eng. C.A. Sept. 5, 1991) (LEXIS, Enggen Library, Cases File)
54. Id.
55. Operative phrases or words are terms of art that have specific and generally accepted meanings
within the law or within a trade or profession. This is especially true in some areas of the law that are
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avoid contractual liability. However, the use of operative phrases such as "we
agree," "we undertake," or "we promise" generally will lead U.S. courts to
find contractual intent. Thus, the U.S. district court in Mutual Export Corp.
v. Westpac Banking Corp.56 held that the use of words of promise, although
not conclusive, should be viewed as a strong indication of an intent to form
a contractually binding obligation. The court explained that a letter writer's
"use of the word 'undertakes' . . . while not mystically transforming [the
instrument] into a contract, nevertheless reinforces [that conclusion]." 57
Aptly worded comfort instruments, therefore, avoid using the operative
phraseology of law or custom. Avoiding the operative words of contract and
using clear disclaimer language should insulate the issuing party from
contractual liability irrespective of evidence of reliance upon the
instrument.58
A comfort letter issuer who uses overly assuring language can incur
liability. For example, a U.S. district court placed little significance upon the
affixation of the term "comfort letter" to the instrument in question.59 The
case involved the issuance of a letter from the purchaser of a borrower's oil
products to the borrower's bank. The letter assured the bank of the issuer's
intent to purchase oil from the borrower, and that it would pay the purchase
amounts directly into an account at the bank. Partially based upon the letter,
the bank extended credit to the seller-borrower. The court stated that "[n]o
matter how the language . . . is characterized-as a 'guarantee' . . . or merely
a 'comfort letter' . . the [instrument] . . . could arguably be deemed
inseparable from the [underlying] contract." 6' The letter writer could thus
be liable for justifiable reliance and the resultant damages. These Anglo-
American cases indicate that the trend in the United States, and especially in
England, is toward a greater likelihood of enforceability. "No longer is it safe
[under Anglo-American law] for difficult negotiations over the inclusion in a
letter of comfort of an express statement as to its legal effect to end on the
tacit understanding . . . that the letter is not of contractual effect." 6" The
following civil law comparison provides even greater support for the potential
of comfort instrument enforceability.
2. A Civil Law Comparison
A number of features unique to various civil law legal systems, inside and
outside the area of comfort instruments, may trap the unwary American
imbued with long traditions of using certain terms or instruments. For example, the law of real estate
conveyancing "embodies terms of art whose meanings and effect have long since been determined by the
courts." Hillas & Co. v. Arcos, 147 L.T.R. 503, 513 (Eng. H.L. 1932) (emphasis added).
56. 789 F. Supp. 1279 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 983 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1993).
57. Id. at 1286.
58. See Chromalloy Am. Corp. v. Universal Hous. Sys. of Am., 495 F. Supp. 544, 551 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) ("In light of all the written disclaimers of contractual liability which were made, any reliance on
the existence of a[n] ... agreement was unreasonable.").
59. See Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas v. Amoco Oil Co., 573 F. Supp. 1464 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
60. Id. at 1473.
61. Christopher Bright & Susan Bright, Beware the Letter of Comfort, 138 NEw L.J. 365, 367
(1988).
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attempting to transact business with a foreign entity.62 A selected review of
some of these idiosyncrasies will show the daunting task that faces the
American business person abroad.
The first set of idiosyncracies encountered abroad can be found in
European contract formation doctrine. Article 1590 of the French Civil Code,
for example, implores the use of the doctrine of arrhes. 6 It refers to a buyer
who gives money or a thing of value to a seller to evidence the making of a
contract. It is akin to the earnest money deposit used in Anglo-American law
to bind a contract.' Unlike Anglo-American contract law, the use of arrhes
gives the buyer and the seller an option to terminate the contract. The parties
are "at liberty to withdraw."6" In the case of withdrawal, whether in good
faith or in bad, the buyer forfeits her deposit while the seller must return
"double the amount."6 6 Thus, a comfort letter coupled with such a good faith
deposit can result in an unintended loss of money.
The French Civil Code also adopts the Roman law notion of laesio ultra
dimidium vel enormis, in which a contract is subject to attack if it is
determined that the price paid is one-half or less the value of the item
purchased.67 Originating in the Middle Ages, the notion of inequality of
consideration is now codified in article 1647 of the French Civil Code: "If the
price of an immovable object is inadequate by more than seven-twelfths, the
seller has the right to demand rescission of the sale."" This is true even if
the seller had renounced her right to rescission in writing. The right of
rescission gives the purchaser two options: to return the item or to pay "the
balance of the just price. "69 Unlike the just price theories of the Middle
Ages, the purchaser does not have a right of rescission if she has paid more
than one and seven-twelfths the item's value. Thus, under European law, a
bid or offer letter to purchase at a below-market price may be subject to
rescission or reformation.
Another concept foreign to Anglo-American contract law is the civil law
notion of nachftist notice, which allows a buyer or seller to fix an additional
time for performance beyond that which is specified in the contract.70 This
62. For example, the granting of specific performance is more common in civil law countries, than
it is in common law ones. "'[lin civil law specific performance is the normal remedy as regards all
obligations and damages are awarded only when specific performance is not possible.'" Robert B. von
Mehren & P. Nicholas Kourides, International Arbitrations Between States and Foreign Private Parties:
77e Libyan Nationalization Cases, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 476, 499 (1981) (quoting BP Exploration Co.
(Libya) v. Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, 53 I.L.R. 297, 349 (BP/Libya Concession Trib.
1979)).
63. See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1590 (Fr.).
64. See, e.g., Weidner v. Hyland, 255 N.W. 134, 135 (Wis. 1934); 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES
ON AMERICAN LAW 661-63 (George F. Comstock ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co. llth ed. 1867).
65. C. civ. art. 1590 (Fr.).
66. Id.
67. See id. art. 1674-75.
68. Id. art. 1681.
69. Id. (emphasis added).
70. See RICHARD SCHAFFER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW AND ITS ENVIRONMENT 111
(2d ed. 1993) ("[C]ivil-law systems traditionally grant an additional period of time, beyond the date called
for in the contract, within which the parties may perform. This is often referred to in French civil law as
mise en demeur and in German law as nachfrist, meaning 'the period after.'") (emphasis added). The
closest that the UCC gets to such notice requirements is its provisions for "notice of termination" and its
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concept was adopted in articles 47 through 49 of the CISG. The buyer may
give notice to the seller that she will accept delivery beyond the time
prescribed.7" The buyer is then enjoined from taking legal action during the
nachftist period and must accept any proper tender of performance during that
period.72 If the seller makes a request for a nachfrist extension, the buyer is
obligated to respond to the request. Failure to do so results in an automatic
grant of additional time.73 The failure of the breaching party to perform
during the extension allows the other party to declare an immediate avoidance
of the contract. 74
An American business person unaware of this practice may face
unintended liabilities. She may mistake a nachfrist notice as a meaningless,
nonlegal request for more time. If she fails to respond properly, she could
unintentionally grant additional time and freeze her legal options. Moreover,
were she to reject the delivery of goods during the nachfrist period, she might
incur liability for the purchase price and, possibly, for additional freight and
storage costs. The existence of an express "time of the essence" clause is
unlikely to provide a party with any protection from the use of nachfrist
notice. Therefore, it is important for a business person to realize that the legal
consequences of seemingly meaningless communications should be
investigated fully. In this context, a comfort instrument assuring performance
within the extended time period would be of greater legal significance.
Other significant differences in the use and interpretation of comfort
instruments can also be found in Germany. The Patronatserkl~irungen, or
letter of responsibility, is a commonly used instrument in German business
and finance transactions.75 One commentator has predicted that these
informal instruments will be used increasingly in the future: "iT]hese parental
letters of support in their numerous variants have been consistently on the
onward march during the last 10 to 15 years and. . . they rank, in terms of
numbers particularly for large corporations as issuers, on an equal footing
with the 'old fashioned' guarantees."'7 This presumption of enforceability is
grounded upon the fact that German contract law is less dependent upon legal
literalism than much Anglo-American jurisprudence. Contracting parties are
given free reign under the Bfirgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB), or Civil Code, in
structuring their contractual relationships.77 For example, unlike the
mandates of the statute of frauds in Anglo-American law, German law
request for "adequate assurance." See U.C.C. §§ 2-309, 2-609 (1994). In the area of adequate assurance,
a merchant may request security or assurance that the other party intends and is able to perform. It is not
inconceivable that one party may grant additional time for performance in exchange for such an assurance.
71. See CISG, supra note 9, art. 47, para. 1.
72. See id. art. 47, para. 2.
73. See id. art. 48, para. 2.
74. See id. art. 49, para. l(b).
75. See Letters of Responsibility, supra note 48, at 303 (statement of Hannes Schneider) ("[The]
Patronatserklarungen, are perhaps rather frighteningly, much in use in my country.").
76. Id.
77. See Christoph von Teichman, Germany, Federal Republic, in I LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING
BUSINESS IN WESTERN EUROPE 205, 216 (Dennis Campbell ed., 1983) [hereinafter DOING BUSINESS IN
WESTERN EUROPE] ("[T]he parties are not bound to any specific type of contract dealt with in the [Civil
Code]."); see also ERNEST C. SnEFFEL, GERMAN COMMERCIAL LAW (1956).
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provides that "a merchant's guarantee is valid even if given only verbally.""8
In fact, there are no provisions in the BGB that deal specifically with
guarantee-type agreements. 79 This legal informalism provides parties with
greater flexibility to structure transactions and, accordingly, with additional
types of instruments to effectuate their intent: "They are at liberty to agree to
variants [of accepted contract types] ... or to develop entirely new types.""
Thus, the evolution and enforceability of comfort-type instruments is a likely
response to this underlying informalism in German contract law.
Furthermore, the German approach to contractual liability is more
consequence-based than that of the common law system. German law places
less emphasis on the types of legal instruments used, the labels applied to
these instruments,"' and the legal meaning of the words used within the
instruments. The German approach, rather than literally interpreting the
language used, attempts instead to give effect to the purpose of the
instruments:
By contrast with. . . English legal doctrine, German courts favor the so-called teleological
method of interpretation: rather than restricting themselves to a literal interpretation of the
wording of a provision, they tend to consider the purpose of the [statute) and to interpret
it in the way best suited to meet that purpose .... 82
Enforceability is therefore unlikely to be determined by formalistic labeling
or by a disclaimer that an instrument is an assurance rather than a formal
guaranty. Instead, the importance of context in determining actual, subjective
intention is the cornerstone of German contract interpretation. Article 133 of
the BGB states that "[i]n interpreting a declaration of intention the true
intention shall be sought without regard to the declaration's literal
meaning. " ' One commentator has construed article 133 to encourage the
interpretation of contracts "in light of [their] contractual economic
purposes."' Thus, the full breadth of a relationship can be relied upon to
find contractual intent in an instrument that, on its face, indicates otherwise.
This is reflected in the fact that the European guaranty, despite being very
78. von Teichman, supra note 77, at 216.
79. See Wolfang Hering, The Commercial Laws of Germany, in 3 DIGEST OF COMMERCIAL LAWS
OF THE WORLD 62 (Lester Nelson ed., 1992) ("There are no specific provisions in the Civil or
Commercial Code concerning guarantees. Yet, guarantees are as common in Germany as in any other
industrialized country.").
80. von Teichman, supra note 77, at 216.
81. The importance of labels and using accepted forms of agreement to ensure enforceability in
Anglo-American contract law is often overstated:
Merely terming a document a letter of intent will not be conclusive as to how a court will
construe the document. For example, if the document does not clearly and unequivocally
indicate that no binding obligations are to arise until a definitive agreement has been reached,
a court might look at the intent of the parties and find that the letter of intent constitutes a
binding contract.
Harvey L. Temkin, When Does the "Fat Lady" Sing?: An Analysis of "Agreements in Principle" in
Corporate Acquistions, 55 FoRDHAM L. REV. 125, 129 n.18 (1986) (citing JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH
M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 2-7, at 30-33 (2d ed. 1977)).
82. von Teichman, supra note 77, at 206.
83. § 133 BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] (F.R.G.).
84. NAGLA NASSAR, SANCTITY OF CONTRACTS REVISITED: A STUDY IN THE THEORY AND PRACTICE
OF LONG-TERM INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 44 (1995).
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short in length, is generally enforceable.
Informal letters of assurance or comfort, generally unenforceable in
American and English courts, are more likely to be taken seriously under this
purpose-oriented jurisprudence. For example, recording a comfort instrument
on the company's financial statements may give it an aura of legal
consequence: "[A] letter which does not have to be shown on the balance
sheet is usually of questionable value to the bank." 5 In addition, one
commentator on German law reasoned that if a comfort letter given by a
parent company stated that it would provide its subsidiary "the financial
means" to meet its obligations, then the recipient would have a direct claim
against the parent.8 6
In sum, a number of factors in the German legal system weigh in favor
of the enforceability of certain "informal" letters used in the business world.
First, German jurisprudence encourages the creation of legal hybrids. Second,
there is a general belief in the business community that "parents do back their
subsidiaries."87 Third, there is a general presumption in favor of
enforceability. For example, in the area of financial reporting, any uncertainty
as to the binding nature of such letters is resolved in favor of reporting them
as a potential liability. "[T]he parent [company] must prove that both sides
have agreed only to a moral commitment if it wants to avoid" the notation of
the assurance on its financial statements.88 Given the brevity of formal
guaranty instruments, the informal categorization of legal instruments in
general, and the underlying teleological jurisprudence, American companies
should be cautious in issuing comfort instruments in jurisdictions following the
German approach.
Like the German legal system, the French legal system creates a
presumption in favor of enforceability. French law approaches the efficacy of
informal letters of business in a direct, common-sense way by asking: Would
two sophisticated commercial entities intend to create a meaningless,
unenforceable instrument? To the French, "the creation [in the commercial
world] of a meaningless instrument is unthinkable." 9 Comfort instruments
are more likely to be considered obligations defaire0 that commit the issuer
to some level of performance. In comparing English law with French law one
can conclude that the "French analysis of contracts may make the courts
[more likely] to enforce promises in a parent company's comfort letter about
repaying its subsidiary's debts than in English law." 9 This may even be the
case when assurances are made orally. Unlike the common law statute of
frauds requirement that guaranty instruments be in writing, the French Civil
Code states that "[w]ith respect to merchants, acts of commerce may be
85. Letters of Responsibility, supra note 48, at 300 (statement of Adrian M.H. Smart).
86. Id. at 305 (statement of Hans Schneider).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 308 (statement of Hans Schneider).
89. Id. at 302 (statement of Ldon Proscour). For a discussion of the importance of agreement in
French jurisprudence as compared to English law, see Anne de Moor, Contract and Agreement in English
and French Law, 6 OXFoRD J. LEGAL STUD. 275, 275-81 (1986).
90. Obligation defaire translates as a "commitment to perform."
91. What Comfort Letters Really Mean, Bus. L. BRIEF, May 1989, available in LEXIS, News
Library, BLB File.
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proved by all means."'
Like German and French contract law, the Belgian Civil Code reflects a
purpose- or consequence-oriented jurisprudence. The language used in the
instrument is but one factor influencing interpretation and enforcement
decisions. Article 1156 dictates that the jurist seek "the common intention of
the contracting parties rather than stop at the mere literal sense of
language."93 Courts that interpret contracts or instruments must attempt to
effectuate the document's intended consequences. In ambiguous cases, the
courts are to choose a meaning that "would have some effect" rather than a
meaning "which. . . could not produce any [effect]." 94 Furthermore, the
Belgian Civil Code requires all contracts to be executed in good faith95 and
their interpretations to be supplemented by custom and usage. 6 Article 1135
states that "[a]greements obligate not only for what is expressed therein, but
also for all the consequences which equity, usage or the law gives to an
obligation according to its nature."' If the essence of a letter is to induce
reliance, then the possibility for enforceability exists. Moreover, the
facilitating factors of equity and usage may add or subtract from the
enforceability decision.
Second order rules of interpretation are also codified in the Belgian Civil
Code. First, a counterpart to the English contra proferentem rule construes
ambiguities in written instruments against the drafters.98 Second, "customary
usage" and usage found in a particular region are implied in contracts that are
created in such a region.99 Third, the integrity of the entire instrument is to
be maintained. Article 1158 states that terms are to be interpreted in "the
sense which is most suitable for the subject-matter of the contract." 1oo
Courts may use these factors to construe a comfort instrument against its
issuer and to find its representations enforceable.
Despite the discretion that it allows judges in determining the essence of
a contract, the Belgian Civil Code also restricts the type of evidence that a
court may consider-reducing the potential for comfort letter liability
emerging from outside of the language of the document. It combines a statute
of frauds requirement with a strict parol evidence rule. All contracts for sales
of more than three thousand francs must be in writing and executed before a
notary or by private signature. 10' Oral evidence is inadmissible regardless
92. C. civ. art. 109 (Fr.) (emphasis added). The greater informality and simplicity of French
commercial contracts may also be due to the fact that there are fewer lawyers to consult for legal advice.
"Overall, France had fewer legal experts than any other Western countries, 1 per 2000 inhabitants, as
against 1 per 1200 in former West Germany and 1 per 500 in the USA." COLLIN RANDLESOME, BusINESS
CULTURES IN EUROPE 109 (2d ed. 1993). Alternatively, the fewer attorneys per capita may be due to the
fact that business persons are more predisposed to maintain their transactions as agreements between
merchants and not between their attorneys.
93. BELGIAN CIWL CODE [C. CIV.] art. 1156 (BeIg.).
94. Id. art. 1157.
95. See id. art. 1134.
96. See id. art. 1135.
97. Id. (emphasis added).
98. See id. art. 1162.
99. See id. arts. 1159-60.
100. Id. art. 1158.
101. See id. art. 1341.
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of whether it contradicts or simply clarifies the written agreement.
Furthermore, "[n]o evidence by witnesses against and outside of the content
of instruments is allowed, nor as to what is alleged to have been said before,
at the time of, or after the making of the instruments."'" As a result, the
receiver of a comfort instrument is unlikely to be able to reach the evidentiary
threshold for enforceability.
The jurisprudence of comfort letter enforceability is still evolving
internationally. The parties' presumption of nonenforceability no longer
determines issuer liability in all cases."0 3 In practice, the presumption may
be in favor of enforceability. Whereas in common law countries, formality is
a prerequisite to enforceability, in civil law countries, the "formal contract is
not the dramatic event . . . .[A]s a result, the courts in civil law [countries]
are more likely to declare the parties legally bound at an earlier stage of the
negotiation process than courts in common law countries."'" At those
earlier stages of negotiation, comfort instruments are likely to be considered
in determining precontractual liability. Commercial literature in Spain, for
example, has discussed the dilemma that the presumption of nonenforceability
has created: Once the legal and business communities infuse these instruments
with the trappings of a contractual undertaking, it becomes difficult to avoid
attendant promissorial or reliance-based liabilities.' 5 The infusion of these
trappings is growing more evident on two fronts. First, the business and legal
communities are developing standards regarding the contents of such letters.
Second, there is increasing incorporation of customized, detailed
representations and assurances in the letters. One can argue that the greater
the detail and acceptance of such letters, the closer they will move into the
domain of legally enforceable contractual obligations. The next section
analyzes the factors that a court may weigh when rendering an enforceability
decision.
B. Common Factors Affecting Enforceability
The courts have long looked to the circumstances surrounding the
issuance of a written instrument to determine whether the required intent to
create legal relations exists. Lord Wilberforce restated the notion of the
totality of the circumstances analysis: "In commercial contracts it is certainly
right that the court should know the commercial purpose of the contract and
this in turn presupposes knowledge of the genesis of the transaction, the
102. Id.
103. This presumption exists because such instruments do not possess the operative words and labels
of suretyship. This lack of guaranty-type nomenclature is especially important for the presumption of
enforceability in the common law legal system.
104. John Klein & Carla Bachechi, Precontractual Liability and the Duty of Good Faith Negotiation
in International Transactions, 17 Hous. J. INT'L L. 1, 17 (1994) (quoting Ralph B. Lake, Letters of
Intent: A Comparative Examination Under English, U.S., French, and West German Law, 18 GEO. WASH.
J. INT'L L. & ECON. 331, 342 (1984)). Klein and Bachechi note that "[c]ivil law jurisdictions have
historically proven more receptive to claims based upon precontractual liability." Id. at 4.
105. See Sacasas & Wiesner, supra note 2, at 330 n.50 (citing Gurrea, La Llamada 'Carta de
Confort'y Su Problematica Juridica, 16 REVISTA DE DERECHO BANCARIO Y BURSATIL 779 (1984)).
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background, the context, the market in which the parties are operating." 0 6
Relevant information includes oral representations, prior dealings, usage and
custom, reliance, and professional standards.
1. Oral Representations and Prior Dealings
The lack of a writing requirement in the CISG and some civil law systems
allows a party to submit evidence to overcome the contractual shortcomings
of a comfort instrument. Prior dealings between the parties may be used to
bolster the enforceability claim of the comfort letter's receiver. Prior dealings
may be regarded "as establishing a common basis of understanding for
[purposes of] interpreting [the parties'] expressions and conduct" 07 relating
to the transaction in question. Comfort instruments are generally a product of
"vigorous negotiations." 08 Consequently, freed from the limitations of the
parol evidence rule, courts in international contract cases have a greater
variety of admissible evidence to consider. Plaintiffs may attempt to use prior
dealings and oral representations to show that the comfort instrument, despite
its vagueness, was intended to be a legally enforceable assurance.
Other party-specific factors on which courts often focus include the
sophistication of the parties0 9 and the content of the communications or
advice that each of the parties received from its attorneys. If a defendant
argues that she did not intend to create a legally binding obligation, then the
advice that she received from her legal counsel will be directly relevant to the
issue of intent. Also, if the plaintiff argues that she had relied upon the
comfort letter, then the advice she received from counsel regarding the
enforceability of such a letter will bear upon the reasonableness of her
reliance. A Canadian court, holding that such evidence was admissible,
concluded that since the plaintiff must prove reliance, "it would be relevant
to show that at the time of the loan, the plaintiff had been advised by its
solicitor that it could not rely on those letters."110 Thus, the scope of the
comfort letter negotiations, prior dealings, and the legal advice that the parties
received are important factors in determining the parties' states of mind
regarding the legality of the comfort instrument.
2. Custom and Usage
Just as domestic contracts are supported by local custom and trade
106. Reardon Smith Line, Ltd. v. Yngvar Hansen-Tangen [1976] 1 W.L.R. 989, 996 (Eng. H.L.)
(appeal taken from Eng. C.A.).
107. U.C.C. § 1-205(1) (1994).
108. Ren6 Sacasas et al., Keep-Well Letters: The Elusive Contingency, CPA J., Nov. 1989, at 46,
46 (discussing accountants' use of comfort letters).
109. In the area of corporate negotiations and acquistions "some courts have specifically noted that
the parties involved are sophisticated business people." Temkin, supra note 81, at 141 n.68.
110. Zidenburg v. Greenberg, No. 70300/91Q, 1993 Ont. C.J. LEXIS 2157, at *10 (Ont. Ct. J.
Aug. 24, 1993); see also Bank of New Zealand v. Ginivan [1991] 1 N.Z.L.R. 178, 181 (C.A. 1990)
(holding that guarantee was enforceable because respondents had also received independent legal advice).
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usage,"' international transactions are formed and performed within a
milieu of customary law: "Usages of trade... furnish the background and
give particular meaning to the language used [in agreements to provide] the
framework of common understanding controlling any general rules of
law." ' 2 In 1961, Professor Goldstajn boldly stated that "a new law
merchant is rapidly developing in the world of international trade. It is time
that recognition be given to the existence of an autonomous commercial law
that has grown independent of the national systems of law."11 3 The
enforceability of a commercial instrument such as a comfort letter will be
affected by these general customs of international business transactions, the
usage of a particular business or trade, and the usage of the locality in which
it is to be performed." 4
The custom or usage pertaining to the enforceability of comfort
instruments is likely to change as they become increasingly detailed and are
used as guarantees or assurances. Until the middle of this century, U.S. courts
held that once a custom was established, it became "a rule of law that
supplemented the common law.""' Business deals have collapsed because
of a bank's request that a parent company "effectively act as a guarantor by
submitting a 'letter of comfort.'"16 The more that such instruments are
referred to in legal terminology, the greater the likelihood that custom and
usage will evolve so as to support comfort instrument enforceability. One
commentator has noted that "the term and concept has been freely adopted
in... business transactions ... giving substance to the generalization that
such [instruments] provide some legal comfort."" 7 The enforceability of
comfort instruments, however, varies from one trade or business to another
depending upon its particular customs and usage. For example, a validity
letter in asset-based financing is generally considered to be enforceable against
the officer or shareholder providing the assurance."' In contrast, a comfort
letter given by a parent company stating that it will monitor the liabilities of
a subsidiary is likely to be construed as a nonbinding, good faith
111. See California Lettuce Growers v. Union Sugar Co., 289 P.2d 785, 790 (Cal. 1955) ("It is the
general rule that, when there is a known usage of the trade... the usage forms part of the contract, and
that evidence of usage is always admissible."). For a review of trade usage as applied in U.C.C.
§ 1-205(4), see Amy H. Kastely, Stock Equipment for the Bargain in Fact: Trade Usage, "Express
Terms," and Consistency Under Section 1-205 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 64 N.C. L. REV. 777
(1986).
112. U.C.C. § 1-205 cmt. 4 (1994).
113. Alexsander Goldstajn, The New Law Merchant, 1961 J. BUS. L. 12, 12.
114. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-205 cmt. 5 (1994) ("An applicable usage of trade in the place where any
part of the performance is to occur shall be used in interpreting the agreement as to that part of the
performance.").
115. Elizabeth Warren, Trade Usage and Parties in the Trade: An Economic Rationale for an
Inflexible Rule, 42 U. Prrr. L. REv. 515, 519 (1981) (citation omitted).
116. U.K.: Investors Threaten Court Action, SCOT. ON SUNDAY, Apr. 17, 1994, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Scotsm File.
117. Sacasas & Wiesner, supra note 2, at 337 (emphasis added). In other situations a comfort
instrument might not be legally binding but could hold the weight of moral suasion.
118. See AssET-BASED FINANCING: A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE, supra note 3, § 26 app. at 26-200;
see also Peter A. Alces, The Efficacy of Guaranty Contracts in Sophisticated Commercial Transactions,
61 N.C. L. REv. 655 (1983) (maintaining that wel-structured contracts of guaranty may be enforceable).
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assurance. 11 9
3. Reliance
Anglo-American contract law has often used reliance theory to fill in gaps
in the enforceability determination. The concept of reliance has been used to
overcome shortcomings in contractual intent, lack of consideration, and failure
to satisfy statute of frauds requirements. As a result, there are several reasons
for avoiding the use of a formal guaranty. 2 It can induce actual reliance
on the part of the comfort instrument receiver, or it can result in a strong case
for promissory estoppel. 2 If the failure to use an instrument of formal
guaranty was an accommodation to the letter writer for a reason other than
liability avoidance, then the use of an informal comfort letter should not be
conclusive as to enforceability. It may be shown, however, that the letter
writer intended to be bound. Furthermore, proof of reliance would strengthen
the plaintiffs case. Such reliance would be shown if the recipient would not
have consummated the transaction but for the assurances given in the comfort
instrument. For example, the plaintiff in Lloyd's Bank Canada v. Canada Life
Assurance Co.' argued in favor of reliance liability based upon the
issuance of a comfort letter and providing certain oral assurances. "[Lloyd's
Bank] alleged that [Continental Bank] made the loan in reliance on comfort
letters and related oral assurances given by the defendants ... to induce the
loan. It plead[ed] that those letters and the oral assurances constituted a
'support agreement. ' "1"a In the common law, liability may be affixed, if not
through the clear expression of contractual intent, then by a finding of
reasonable reliance. The quasi-contractual nature of comfort instruments
makes them susceptible to the ever-expanding doctrines of promissory estoppel
and detrimental reliance. 24
4. Professional Standards
Court decisions may bring greater certainty to the issue of comfort issuer
liability. In order to manage such liability, particular groups of comfort
issuers have begun to develop guidelines for the contents of their comfort
instruments. This standardization of comfort instruments has initially come
from professional groups that wish to avoid liability. One commentator has
119. See, e.g., Kleinwortl [1988] 1 W.L.R. at 802.
120. Examples include wanting to avoid the entry of a liability on the third party's financial
statements and statutory restrictions on the ability of a governmental agency, financial institution, or
insurance company to give guaranties. See, e.g., Lloyd's Bank Can. v. Canada Life Assurance Co., No.
18929/87, 1991 Ont. C.J. LEXIS 1015, at *23 (Ont. Ct. J. Oct. 11, 1991) (indicating that insurance
companies are prohibited by statute from guaranteeing repayment of third party debt).
121. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
122. Lloyd's Bank Can. v. Canada Life Assurance Co., No. 18929/87, 1990 Ont. C.J. LEXIS 304
(Ont. Ct. J. June 5, 1990).
123. Id. at *3-4.
124. See Charles Knapp, Reliance in the Revised Restatement: The Proliferation of Promissory
Estoppel, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 52 (1981). But cf. Phuong N. Pham, Note, The Waning of Promissory
Estoppel, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1263 (1994) (arguing that contemporary commentators overstate
expansiveness of courts' use of promissory estoppel).
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cited "self-regulatory rules of professional organizations" as a source of
international business law."s Both the German Institute of Certified Public
Accountants and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants have
issued guidelines and standards for comfort letters. An American Institute task
force, anticipating increased liability, recommended restricting the availability
of comfort letters from accountants. 1
26
In international banking, the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision has
developed monitoring guidelines for transnational banking activities.'27 Its
Revised Concordat of 1983128 recognized concerns over the use of comfort
instruments by parent banks and their subsidiaries and in banking consortiums
and joint ventures: "Banks . . .cannot . . . be indifferent to the situation of
their joint ventures and may have commitments to these establishments beyond
the legal . . . for example through comfort letters."1 29 Individual countries
have also acted to regulate these instruments in international commerce. For
example, partly in order to preempt the use of comfort instruments as devices
to avoid formal guarantees in cross-border financing, the U.S. Congress
passed § 13228(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993.13°
This section adopts a very broad "guarantor classification rule" that
effectively includes comfort letters.' 3 ' The development of these types of
professional standards and governmental regulations provides additional
sources that may assist a plaintiff in reaching the evidentiary threshold for
enforceability.
C. No Per Se Rules of Enforceability
The previous review of national laws and common factors pertaining to
potential liability for assurances given in informal letters of commerce reveals
that there are no per se rules of enforceability. However, as a general rule,
the broader and the more vaguely drafted the letter, the lower the likelihood
of enforceability. For example, in the area of international project financing,
lenders frequently require a comfort letter from principal shareholders in the
125. FILIP DE LY, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW AND LEx MERCATORIA 133 (1992).
126. See Vicky Stamas, Accountants' Association Plans to Limit Assurances on Official Statements,
BOND BUYER, Oct. 4, 1991, at 1.
127. The Basle Committee is made up of banking regulators from twelve industrialized nations. See
generally J.J. Norton, The Work of the Basle Supervisors Committee on Bank Capital Adequacy and the
July 1988 Report on "International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards", 23
INT'L LAW. 245 (1989) (discussing Basle Committee's initial efforts and subsequent developments setting
forth framework for capital adequacy measurement and minimum capital standards).
128. Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices, Revised Basle Concordat on
Principles for the Supervision of Banks' Foreign Establishments, reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 900 (1983).
129. Id. at 906; see also Duncan E. Alford, Basle Committee Minimum Standards: International
Regulatory Response to the Failure of BCCI, 26 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 241 (1992).
130. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13228(b), 107 Stat,
312, 494 (1993) (amending 26 U.S.C. § 1630)(6)(D)(iii) (1994)).
131. See id. ("Mhe term 'guarantee' includes any arrangement under which a person (directly or
indirectly) through an entity or otherwise, assumes, on a conditional or unconditional basis, the payment
of another person's obligation under any circumstances."). See generally Aaron A. Rubinstein & Todd
Tuckner, Financing U.S. Investments After the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, 25 TAx ADVISER 111,
113 (1994) (explaining that classification of guarantee is so broadly defined that it covers any form of
credit support including comfort letters).
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hope of obligating the latter to keep the project corporation in sound financial
condition. The shareholders' attorneys generally draft these letters with vague
assurances. One commentator concluded that "since these obligation clauses
are usually very broadly worded, the enforceability of these commitments is
often questionable under any legal system."1
32
The initial presumption against enforceability in English and American
law was probably due to the vagueness and breadth of the first generation of
comfort instruments. Comfort letters were often used to mask fundamental
differences between the parties involved in a transaction. The use of comfort
letters or letters of assurance to mask gaps in a business deal has been
documented:
Comfort letters are a species of those ambiguous declarations which negotiators often use
to save a deal threatened by lack of agreement on an important point. . . .It is a lawyer's
cover-up of a disagreement. The lawyer keeps his fingers crossed and prays that there may
never be litigation over the meaning of his handiwork.'33
The more detailed a comfort letter, the greater the likelihood that a court
will find contractual intent or allow reliance-based recovery. Providing greater
contextual detail in a letter "offer[s an attorney] considerable factual
representations and promises on which to argue detrimental reliance."' 34 If,
for example, the issuer agrees not to sell its ownership interest in a subsidiary
or to notify the recipient of any change of ownership, then the operative
words of promise and obligation are more likely to be implied. The comfort
letter recipient, however, would still have the burden of proving damages
related to the breach of the assurance. Would notice have allowed the party
to takes steps to safeguard her position? The strongest type of representation,
short of a formal guaranty, would occur when the letter writer promises to
take affirmative steps to ensure that its affiliate meets its obligations.
Moreover, language that suggests that a present policy will remain the
company's policy until an obligation is satisfied,' 35 or that a parent company
will use its "best endeavors"136 to assist its subsidiary in the future, would
be considered tantamount to a guaranty.
In short, the international business person should operate under the
assumption that there are no per se rules of enforceability for comfort
instruments. As a result, the business person should undertake an analysis of
the common factors that courts use to affix liability. She should scrutinize the
wording in comfort instruments for potentially enforceable assurances with a
full understanding of the legal idiosyncrasies found in the world's different
legal systems. She should also consider the impact of the enactment of the
CISG because as a source of international contract, the CISG may become the
132. Kimmo Mettmi, Governing-Law Clauses of Loan Agreements in International Project
Financing, 20 INT'L LAw. 219, 223 (1986) (emphasis added).
133. A.H. Hermann, Real Comfort in a Comfort Letter, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1988, at 13, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Fintme File.
134. Sacasas & Wiesner, supra note 2, at 335 (quoting Gilbert, Comfort Letters: A Banker's View,
64 J. COM. BANK LENDING 48 (1982)).
135. See What Comfort Letters Really Mean, supra note 91 (arguing that statement of future intent
of corporate policy should be enforceable).
136. Bank of New Zealand v. Ginivan [1991] 1 N.Z.L.R. 178, 179 (C.A. 1990).
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vehicle for comfort instrument enforceability. With this review in mind, the
remainder of this Article will explore the substance and relevance of the CISG
to the future of comfort instrument enforceability.
I. THE CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF
GOODS: A POSSIBLE INTERNATIONAL RESOLUTION OF COMFORT
INSTRUMENT ENFORCEABILITY
[T]he interest in general principles of law both measures the extent of convergence of legal
rules and, under appropriate conditions, facilitates further convergence. 3 "
The issue of comfort instrument enforceability is considerably more
complex within an international context than in one's own national legal
system. Idiosyncrasies found in most national legal systems make the use of
foreign counsel in international contract negotiations a necessity. However,
the movement towards convergence among the world's different legal systems
in the area of transactional law offers hope for a less complicated future.
The impetus to unify contract law stems from three sources: the increase
in economic and legal unions, most noticeably in Europe; the use of "neutral"
country laws; and the increased recognition of general principles of contract
law. The most profound evidence of the move towards the unification of
contract law is the ratification of the CISG. The development of a new
contracts jurisprudence to interpret and bolster the CISG is likely to have
important consequences for comfort instrument enforceability. In the long
term, the movement towards the internationalization of contract law offers the
hope for a more unified approach to comfort instrument enforceability. In the
short term, however, the ratification of the CISG, coupled with the existing
differences in national legal systems, further complicates the issue of
enforceability. The following section will first review the internationalization
of contract law through the enactment of the CISG and the use of general
principles. The section will then conclude with a review of the informality of
contract formation under the CISG and its potential impact on comfort
instrument enforceability.
A. History and Underlying Principles
The CISG is the most recent attempt at contract law unification, which
reaches back to the medieval lex mercatoria. "Besides retention of the
principle of the freedom of contract. . .[its] essential characteristics are
simplicity, practicality and clarity. It is free of legal short-hand, free of
complicated legal theory and easy for businessmen to understand."'" 8 A
quest for uniformity in international business transactions motivated states to
137. John H. Merryman, On the Convergence (and Divergence) of the Civil Law and the Common
Lmv, 17 STAN. J. INT'L L. 357, 377 (1981).
138. Kazuaki Sono, The Wenna Sales Convention: History and Perspective, in INTERNATIONAL SALE
OF GOODS 1, 7 (Petar Sarcevic & Paul Volken eds., 1986). Sono further notes: "That the Convention is
free from dogma is important because it is, after all, businessmen who must understand the meaning of
the provisions." Id.
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adopt the CISG. Yet the CISG was forged from the world's different national
legal systems. In order to promote uniformity, it had to detach itself from the
idiosyncrasies of any one legal system; however, it is a product of the civil,
socialist, and common law systems of contract. As such, it is a unique hybrid
of all three.
The Convention is meant to be interpreted based upon its uniqueness and
not its similarities to any one of the systems from which it was created.
Article 7 mandates that the Convention be interpreted in a way that would
"promote uniformity in its application." 13 9 One commentator has noted that
this dictate of uniformity was meant to allow individual judges to sever their
thinking from domestic law mind-sets. It was an attempt "to free judges,
particularly in countries of the common law tradition, from the iron chains of
precedents, thus permitting them to examine foreign cases as well in order to
attain uniformity."' Thus, national stare decisis is to be supplanted by an
informal supranational stare decisis.
1. CISG Past: Sources and Scope
The simplicity of the Convention masks fundamental differences between
the positions of its civil law and common law signatories. One commentator
has noted that "divergency in the interpretations of civil law and common law
judges [seems] to be inevitable."' In order to avoid this divergence,
common law and civil law judges must alter their approaches in a number of
ways. First, the civil law judge is asked to search other cases throughout the
world and follow precedent in much the same way the common law judge
does within her national system. Second, the common law judge is asked to
look to the travaux priparatories, or legislative history, and to general
principles when making a decision involving an original interpretation of the
Convention. These are the techniques of interpretation in which civil law
judges feel most at home:
It is common knowledge that common law judges seem traditionally less willing to take
recourse to preparatory materials or to refer to the genesis of a statute . . . . [In contrast,]
civil law judges are more willing to refer to the preparatory work or legal history of a text
than their common law colleagues .. . .Continental European judges are far less scrupulous
about taking a functional approach than their English or American counterparts.
14 2
The job of the American jurist has been made easier in a number of
ways. First, "many rules of the Convention [are]... sufficiently akin [to the
UCC] so that experience with one will be readily translatable for use with the
other."' Second, the language is simple and not nation-specific, which
invites original interpretation. "To prevent problems of ... interpretation the
139. CISG, supra note 9, art. 7, para. 1.
140. Sono, supra note 138, at 8.
141. Paul Volken, The Vienna Convention: Scope, Interpretation, and Gap-Filling, in
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS, supra note 138, at 19, 38.
142. Id. at 39-40.
143. Richard D. Kearney, Book Review, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 289, 292 (1984).
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Convention's language is terse and clear, and its concepts are
uncomplicated."'" Furthermore, the rules of the Convention are expressed
in terms of the events found generally in international trade and are not tied
to thematic, abstract elements of contract law.1 45 Third, the Convention
provides a cross-referenced road map for the jurist to follow in reasoning by
analogy. There is a "considerable amount of cross-reference to other pertinent
articles, which reduces substantially that perennial difficulty encountered [by
common law judges and lawyers] in dealing with civil law." 4 1
The backdrop to the CISG was international commercial law, or the lex
mercatoria. The lex mercatoria can be seen as the world's first uniform law,
albeit in an uncodified form. Merchants have long developed usage and
practice that have given them the ability to communicate with one another
without the distractions presented by the nuances of culture, language, and
national legal systems. Professor Honnold has noted that successful sales law
unification entails a body of rules that are event-specific and devoid of
unnecessary legalese. An international sales law "needs to cut out legal
idioms, and write the rules in terms of commercial events that happen around
the world. Without knowing the languages of the world you can be sure that
there have to be words for these commercial events wherever there is
commerce."1
47
Professor Goldstajn has attributed the current rise of a supranational
commercial law to two key factors. First, the "optional character of the law
relating to the sale of goods"' 4 has enabled merchants to transform
customary law. Under international law, most rules of sales law are not
immutable and can be varied by agreement. The CISG has preserved the
optional nature of international sales law. The CISG allows the parties to an
international sales contract to "exclude the application of [the] Convention
or . . .derogate from or vary the effect of any of its provisions."' 49
The second factor that Professor Goldstajn has identified as contributing
to the development of an independent international sales law is the increased
use of arbitration to settle contractual disputes. The Council of Europe, for
example, "started work as early as 1959 on the preparation of a convention
on arbitration."' 50 The European arbitration convention is to "a large extent
based on the various legal systems involved and on the fruit of practical
experience."'' Commercial arbitrators are more likely to make decisions
based upon proarbitration norms than on any predisposition toward a domestic
144. Sara G. Zwart, The New International Law of Sales: A Marriage Between Socialist, Third
World, Common and Civil Law Principles, 13 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 109, 112 (1988).
145. See Kearney, supra note 143, at 291 ("Mhe statement of [a] rule is often expressed in the
context of the events that trigger the rule.").
146. Id. at 291-92.
147. John Honnold, Beyond the Reef: Uniform Law for International Trade, Lecture at the
University of Hawaii (May 13, 1986), quoted in Amy H. Kastely, The Right to Require Performance in
International Sales: Towards an International Interpretation of the Vienna Convention, 63 WASH. L. REV.
607, 609 nn.11-12 (1988).
148. Goldstajn, supra note 113, at 12.
149. CISG, supra note 9, art. 6.
150. COUNCIL OF EUR., LEGAL CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE, 1957-1982, at 37 (1983).
151. Id. at 38.
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law."'52 In turn, this developing international law of commerce has infused
domestic legal systems. Professor Schmitthoff has noted that "[t]he legal
techniques of carrying on international trade are the same everywhere,
irrespective of the political, ideological or economic orientation of the
countries [involved]." 53  These factors, along with widely accepted
supranational rules of commerce, have led to the creation of a law of business
for international transactions.
The movement toward free trade areas has also directly impacted the
unification of sales and contract law. Nowhere has the need for harmonization
of national laws been more pronounced than in Europe." 4 "Typical features
of the current business scene in Europe include a growing number of
international commercial transactions and the expansion of trade as a result of
economic interdependence .... At the same time, there are still broad
discrepancies between legal systems .. 1,'55 The Council of Europe has
specifically addressed the importance of uniform rules and their uniform
application.15
However, in spite of these sources of internationalization, the CISG has
failed to adopt formal recommendations to encourage information exchanges
that would have facilitated the uniform interpretation of supranational
legislation.1 The Council of Europe's commitment to uniformity in
interpretation would be served by adopting enhanced procedures for
communications between member states. In the absence of such procedures,
it will be interesting to see whether European signatories to the CISG will
keep each other informed of CISG-related decisions through their existing
European channels of communication. 5
152. Cf. Goldstajn, supra note 113, at 12 (discussing "peculiarities of the various national systems
of law").
153. C.M. SCHMITrOFF, COMMERCIAL LAW IN A CHANGING ECONOMIC CLIMATE 18-20 (2d ed.
1981).
154. See Jack J. Coe, Jr., Western Europe: A Preface and Primer, in DOING BUSINESS IN WESTERN
EUROPE, supra note 77, at 1, 1 ("The complexity and interdependence of legal, political, monetary and
economic systems which characterizes the modem business arena generally are epitomised in Europe.").
155. COUNCIL OF EuR., supra note 150, at 43.
156. An example of a specific attempt at harmonization is Resolution (78)3 on Penal Clauses in Civil
Law. It was adopted by the Council of Europe to harmonize discrepancies in national laws pertaining to
contractual penalty clauses for untimely performance. The Resolution contains eight rules to guide member
states. Under the Resolution, courts would be allowed to adjust any penalty clause to a more appropriate
amount. For example, article 7 of the Resolution provides that the "sum stipulated may be reduced by the
court when it is manifestly excessive." COUNCIL OF EUR., PENAL CLAUSES IN CIVIL LAW 6-7 (1978).
This is contrary to the laws of Belgium and England where courts are placed in an all-or-nothing situation.
In those countries, if the clause is considered a legitimate liquidated damage provision, then it must be
enforced. If a clause is considered to be an unfair penalty, then it must be stricken. There is no provision
for a reduction or adjustment of the amount in such clauses.
157. One commentator predicts that the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) will continue to monitor the application of and disseminate information on the CISG: "The
Secretariat already has started to monitor the implementation of the Convention, and no doubt will find
ways to collect and disseminate interpretations elsewhere." Zwart, supra note 144, at 127.
158. Private sources may satisfy the courts' need to stay informed of foreign legal decisons when
interpreting and applying the CISG. For example, the Journal of Law and Commerce announced in a 1993
issue that it intended to "feature English translations of foreign court decisions interpreting the United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods." 12 J.L. & COM. 237 (1993).
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2. CISG Present: Application and Motivation
The CISG is only the most recent attempt at unifying international
commercial law.' 59 The most apparent problem, however, with this attempt
to unify commercial law is that it has to be applied through a nonunified court
system. The Convention envisioned the use of an informal system of stare
decisis to help ensure uniformity of interpretation. However, the potential for
diverging interpretations by national courts has proven to be a problem of all
international uniform laws."6
The drafters envisioned that the national trial courts called on to interpret
the Convention would act as informal international appellate courts. These
courts were seen to have two primary functions. First, they would look to
decisions of foreign courts for guidance. Second, they would actively unify
international sales law by distinguishing seemingly inconsistent prior decisions
and by harmonizing differences in foreign interpretations. The preamble to the
Convention envisions national courts "contribut[ing] to the removal of legal
barriers in international trade" by performing these appellate functions.' 6
In sum, the removal of legal barriers to trade is to be accomplished by
interpreting the Convention with "regard... to its international character and
to the need to promote uniformity in its application." 62
In reality, the Convention exhibits characteristics of acute legal
schizophrenia. It is a product of the rules and exceptions of various national
legal systems, including the civil, common law, and socialist systems.'63 In
its application, however, it is intended to divorce itself from the idiosyncratic
meanings of the legal systems from which it came. The rules and terms of the
Convention are to be given original interpretation. A priori meanings taken
from national legal systems are to be abandoned in favor of independent
meanings consistent with the Convention's objectives. 1' These objectives
include the establishment of a "New International Economic Order" 65 and
the creation of a uniform international law of sales. Article 7(2) mandates that
159. See, e.g., FRITz ENDERLEIN & DIETICH MASKOW, UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON
CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS: CONVENTION ON THE LIMITATION PERIOD IN THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 1 (1992) ("Work on the unification of sales law started in the 1920s but
not until 1972 did the laws on sale adopted at a diplomatic conference in the Hague in 1964 ... enter into
force between a few states.. . ."); KRITZER, supra note 9, at app. B at B-1 ("The 1980 Convention
resulted from work instituted in 1968 by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL)."); see also M.J. Bonell, Is It Feasible to Elaborate Uniform Rules Governing the Relations
Between Principal and Agent?, 1 UNIFORM L. REV. 52 (1984).
160. See ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 159, at 7.
161. CISG, supra note 9, pmbl. This would be accomplished by taking "into account the different
social, economic and legal systems." Id.
162. Id. art. 7, para. 1.
163. See ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 159, at 14 ("[The character of the whole regulation
as a compromise is reflected by the individual norms, by combining different principles, e.g. as rules or
exceptions, from which the various legal systems proceed.").
164. See id. at 15. Legislative history is one device used to determine the intent of the drafters of
the Convention. For the legislative history of the CISG, see United Nations Conference on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods, Vienna, 10 March-11 April 1980, Official Records, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
97/19 (E.81.IV.3); see also JOHN HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE UNIFORM LAW FOR
INTERNATIONAL SALES (1989).
165. CISG, supra note 9, pmbl.
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interpretation of the Convention is to be guided by its general principles and
by the rules of private international law. Matters of interpretation are "to be
settled in conformity with the general principles on which it is based " " or,
failing that, with general principles of international contract law.
The unifying principles that govern the interpretation of the Convention
include the unification of law, 67 the internationally recognized principle of
good faith,'68 and the increase in the certainty and predictability of
international transactions.' 69 Secondary norms of interpretation include
filling gaps with internal references, analogy, and the use of the international
reasonable person standard. In filling gaps in the Convention, courts are to
use the techniques of analogy and expansive construction in order to promote
original, uniform interpretations. 170 Article 9(2) authorizes the courts to
imply terms "which in international trade -[are] widely known... and
regularly observed."' The Convention makes clear that the customs and
usage are to be international in character and shall preempt any conflicting
national equivalents. The parties must submit evidence that establishes the
putative custom or usage as a "rule[ governing international trade and not just
domestic transactions." 1
72
In interpreting the Convention the jurist should make use of both civil and
common law interpretive tools. The courts should look within and outside the
Convention for uniform, rational interpretations. '1 From a civil law
standpoint, the courts should look to interpret each article of the Convention
in order to maintain its internal integrity. In interpreting an article, the courts
should look to the meaning of other articles and their relationship to the one
in question.
Common law interpretation should use external principles to dress the
newly crowned "emperor"174 of international sales law. By way of
comparison, Professor Hillman describes the UCC's interpretive approach as
166. CISG, supra note 9, art. 7, para. 2 (emphasis added).
167. See id. art. 7, para. 2 (noting "need to promote uniformity in its application"); id. pmbl.
(noting "adoption of uniform rules").
168. See ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 159, at 57 ("National measures for a conduct based
on good faith are thus only relevant insofar as they are also the recognized measure for international
trade.").
169. See id. at 59 ("Another criterion to be conceived as a general principle of the Convention, at
least when it comes to assessing the scope of the legal consequences which are linked to non-conformance
and/or failure of a party or to the overall legal consequences, can be the predictability of effects.").
170. See id. at 58.
171. CISG, supra note 9, art. 9, para. 2. Quintessential examples of such universally accepted trade
usages include the International Chamber of Commerce's rules pertaining to trade terms and letters of
credit. See INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND PRACTICES FOR
DOCUMENTARY CREDITS (1994).
172. ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 159, at 70.
173. See 1 GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS CONVENTION 101.011 (William A.
Hancock ed., 1996) [hereinafter GUIDE TO THE CISG] ("[R]eference [can be made] to external legal
principles-the common law approach, or by internal analogy-the civil law approach.").
174. "Emperor" is a reference to Professor Leff's seminal work on unconscionability. See Arthur
Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485 (1967). This
reference serves two purposes: to note the potential for the ratification of the CISG as a watershed in
international contract law (as was the UCC's adoption of the doctrine of unconscionability) and to provide
the doctrine of unconscionability as an example of an external principle that may be used in the interpretive
process.
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a combination of methods found in the common and civil laws. He advises:
"Look first at the explicit language of the Code, next to the Code's purposes
and policies and finally, to the common law."' 75 This approach is adopted
under articles 7(1) and 7(2) of the Convention and consists of a number of
steps. First, the courts are to look to the express language of the Convention
and reason by analogy among its different provisions. Second, the courts are
to advance the general principles upon which the Convention was drafted
when making such an interpretation. 176 Third, if an interpretation is not
clear, the court is to make use of private international law as defined in a
relevant national legal system. 177
The quest for uniform application of the CISG will not be a smooth one.
The threat of national courts placing a "domestic gloss"17 on cases of first
impression is real. The ultimate impact of domestically slanted opinions will
depend on the soundness of their reasoning and analysis. Ultimately, the way
in which foreign courts reconcile divergent opinions will determine if
uniformity of application will be achieved.
[A firm] foundation can only be built if courts interpreting the CISG provide detailed and
convincing analyses. Such detailed and convincing analyses... will consider the pertinent
provisions of [the] CISG.. . and will consider the interplay between them. They [should]
also include reference to ... [its] legislative history ... and to scholarly articles . . . . In
so doing, the decisions will have a logic and rationale which will be persuasive of their own
accord . . . . The very compromise that led to CISG's creation will lead to results in its
application which embody these compromises.,7 9
Fortunately, courts concerned with uniform application of the CISG have
a number of techniques and tools at their disposal. The first is to use the
CISG as a fully integrated statute. This will allow a court to use unrelated or
tangentially related articles of the Convention to interpret a given article
without recourse to "domestic gloss." Second, the legislative history of both
the Convention and previous attempts at contract law harmonization will
provide ready-made rationales that will help bridge the divergence among
175. Robert A. Hillman, Construction of the Uniform Commercial Code: U.C.C. Section 1-103 and
'Code' Methodology, 18 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 655, 678 (1977).
176. Article 7(l) states that interpretations of the Convention should pay due regard "to its
international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good
faith in international trade." CISG, supra note 9, art. 7, para. 1 (emphasis added).
177. Article 7(2) states that as a final resort, interpretation is to be based upon "conformity with the
law applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law." Id. art. 7, para. 2. Uniformity should
be advanced by the fact that certain principles, such as the duty of good faith and fairness in the exchange,
can be found in almost all national legal systems.
178. Paul Amato, U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods-7he Open
Price Term and Uniform Application: An Early Interpretation by the Hungarian Courts, 13 J.L. & CoM.
1, 26 (1993). A similar concern can be analogized from the adoption of the UCC by the fifty states. The
purposes given for the UCC can be applied to the aim of uniformity envisioned by the drafters of the
CISG:
Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are,
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial transactions;
(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage
and agreement of the parties;
(c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.
U.C.C. § 1-102(2) (1994).
179. Amato, supra note 178, at 28-29.
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national legal systems. Third, a court may seek the guidance of the
universalized reasonable person as a device for supranational interpretation.
Employing international usage and custom in conjunction with a notion of the
internationalized "reasonable person"' will help courts to avoid national
legal bias. Finally, uncovering and using general principles of contract law,
such as good faith and fair dealing, will help internationalize judicial
interpretation of the Convention.
The path to uniformity in the application of the Convention is likely to be
a rocky one, given the nuances of meaning and the differences among the
national legal systems. The ultimate success of the Convention may turn on
the benefits that it bestows upon commercial parties to "be able to fashion
transactions under a neutral international body of law."181 The Convention
promotes this benefit by facilitating contracts that otherwise would have been
precluded because of disagreement over the choice of law. Article 7 of the
Convention, for example, implies that national courts have an obligation to
recognize foreign court decisions by stating that the Convention should be
interpreted with regard to its "international character and to the need to
promote uniformity in its application." 82
One area of contract law that the Convention needs to unify is the
disparate treatment of comfort instruments. Multi-jurisdictional uniformity can
be seen in American states' interpretation of the UCC and the European
Union's meshing of national and supranational legal systems.183 These
examples of multi-jurisdictional uniformity are more likely to be due to other
factors, such as the formal nature of stare decisis in the United States and the
enactment of a formal legal framework in Europe. Nonetheless, the quest for
multi-jurisdictional uniformity is not without hope or precedent.
The move toward uniformity is supported by several factors. First, the
principle of international comity should encourage judicial deference to
opinions of foreign courts. In Hilton v. Guyot, the U.S. Supreme Court
explained the importance and meaning of comity: "Comity is neither a matter
of absolute obligation, nor of mere courtesy and goodwill.""' To ignore
previously rendered foreign court decisions would "adversely affect the
integrity of the principle of comity."' Consequently, comity may increase
uniformity. Second, a related principle and a cornerstone of civil law
jurisprudence is the use of scholarly writings'86 and legislative history. The
180. CISG, supra note 9, art. 8, para. 2; see also Amato, supra note 178, at 25.
181. Michael Stonberg, Drafting Contracts Under the Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods, 3 FLA. J. INT'L L. 245, 251 (1988).
182. CISG, supra note 9, art. 7, para. 1.
183. See V. Susanne Cook, The Need for Uniform Interpretation of the 1980 United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 50 U. Prrr. L. REv. 197, 200 (1988).
184. 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895); see also Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United
States Dist. Court, 428 U.S. 522 (1987) (explaining comity and application of Hague Evidence Convention
in United States).
185. Larry A. DiMatteo & Kenneth B. Furry, Note, Reciprocity: A Workable Standard for Foreign
Government Antitrust Standing?, 15 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 355, 370 (1982).
186. See John Honnold, The Sales Convention in Action-Uniform International Words: Uniform
Application?, 8 J.L. & COM. 207, 208 (1988) ("Traditional barriers to the use of scholarly writing[s] in
legal development broke down long ago in [the United States] and [are] breaking down in citadels of
literalism in other parts of the common-law world.").
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use of such common sources should positively 'impact the convergence of
national court interpretations of the Convention. Third, the language of the
Convention was specifically chosen to avoid nationally based meanings. The
courts are invited to develop an original meaning for the words and articles
of the Convention.'87 Fourth, customary international law pertaining to
treaty construction encourages uniformity of construction. The Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties directs the initial interpretive inquiry to
focus on the "ordinary meaning" of the Convention's terms in the "context
and in the light of its object and purpose."'88 Furthermore, the Vienna
Treaty Convention "views subsequent judicial decisions as relevant
evidence"'8 9 in the subsequent application of the Convention.
Courts will ideally look to the general principles of treaty interpretation
to foster a uniform application. These principles include the reading of the
Convention independently of nation-specific meanings. The Convention should
be read with reference to its internal "structure and [the] logical
interrelationship of ... [its words] and articles."'g9 This approach will be
more difficult for common law judges. Civil law judges are adept at reasoning
by analogy within the confines of a code because they generally decide civil
law cases by reference, at least tangentially, to some article of a national
code. In contrast, common law judges often have looked outside of a given
code to external principles and sources in order to fill in gaps. Thus, as
Professor Honnold notes, the success of uniformity of application will be
decided by the ability of common law judges "to resist hasty recourse to
domestic rules, and instead to develop the approach ... of gap filling by
analogical application of the [Convention] in order to effectuate its
purpose."' 9'
Fortunately, a number of English court cases have upheld the notion that
preserving the uniformity of international conventions is a paramount goal of
national courts. The House of Lords in Midland Silicones, Ltd. v. Scruttons,
Ltd. stated that in the application of an international convention by different
national courts, "it is very desirable that the same conclusions should be
reached in whatever jurisdiction the question arises."'" The importance of
international uniformity of interpretation was reiterated by Lord Diplock in the
1980 case of Fothergill v. Monarch Airlines, Ltd: "The language of an
international convention is addressed to a much wider and varied judicial
audience . . [than] purely domestic law. It should be
interpreted ... unconstrained by technical rules of English law ... on broad
principles of general acceptance." 1 93
In the short term, the internationalization of contract law presents a
187. The drafters of the Convention intentionally attempted "to replace local legal idioms with
references to facts of commercial life." Id.
188. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 22, 1969, art. 31 para. 1, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.39147 (1989), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).
189. Cook, supra note 183, at 210.
190. Id. at 203.
191. Honnold, supra note 186, at 211.
192. [1962] 1 App. Cas. 446, 471 (1961) (appeal taken from Eng. C.A.) (applying Hague Rules).
193. [1981] 1 App. Cas. 251, 282 (1980) (appeal taken from Eng, C.A.).
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complicated duality. 194 In the hope of simplification and uniformity in the
long term, there is a likelihood of increased complexity in the short term.
Until the jurisprudence surrounding the CISG is universally accepted with
uniform interpretation and application of its provisions, the international
business person will have to confront a number of contract law regimes. The
international lawyer will be "called upon to synthesize diverse and sometimes
conflicting national and supranational policies and supporting legal rules."' 95
For example, a practitioner in Europe will need to be familiar with domestic
laws, the law of the European Union, and the CISG. This is the state of the
current legal milieu in which issuers of international comfort instruments are
to be judged. On the positive side, courts will have another opportunity to
reexamine the degree of clarity and intent needed to make these instruments
enforceable. The use of the CISG's-notion of originalinterpretation may unify
the diverging national opinions regarding comfort letter enforceability.
3. CISG Future: Prospects and Expansion
All legal systems look to commercial practice, trade usage, and custom
to breathe meaning into contracts. The objective theory of contract describes
the reasonable person as possessing the knowledge and sophistication of the
average business person in a given trade or profession. This knowledge
includes the meanings, trade usage, and practices generally known and
accepted in that business or profession. This knowledge is the merchant's tool
to communicate and to effectuate commerce. In the Middle Ages, usage and
practice became a portable law that merchants carried with them from town
to town. "The merchants carried their law, as it were, in the same
consignment as their goods, and both law and goods remained in the places
where they traded and became part of the general stock of the country." 1
96
This base of knowledge is implied into merchants' contracts to imbue express
terms with their technical or trade meanings and to imply usage and custom
to fill in gaps. The importance of trade usage in contractual interpretation was
adopted by the CISG. Article 8 states that in determining the knowledge of the
reasonable person "due consideration is to be given to all relevant
circumstances including.., usages and any subsequent conduct of the
parties."197 Article 9 solidifies the binding nature of trade usage in
194. For an exploration of the notion of an "international law of contracts" in the setting of a
nation-private party contract, see A. A. Fatouros, International Law and the Internationalized Contract,
74 AM. J. INT'L L. 134, 137 (1980).
195. Coe, supra note 154, at 1.
196. WYNDHAM A. BEWES, THE ROMANCE OF THE LAW MERCHANT at vi (1923). The view of the
new lex mercatoria as a modern day descendant of the Roman ius gentium and the medieval law merchant
is not without opposition. "Roman law ius gentium and medieval law may not be invoked as historical
precedents of an autonomous system of international business law." DE LY, supra note 125, at 54. The
common law has long seen custom and usage as an independent source of law. "Once the custom was
proven.., it became an independent source of obligation: a rule of law that supplemented the common
law." Elizabeth Warren, Trade Usage and Parties in the Trade: An Economic Rationale for an Inflexible
Rule, 42 U. PT. L. REv. 515, 519 (1981); see, e.g., Walls v. Bailey, 49 N.Y. 464 (1872).
197. CISG, supra note 9, art. 8, para. 2. The conduct of the parties and their statements are to be
interpreted as a reasonable person would have interpreted them in that trade. "[Sitatements made by and
other conduct of a party are to be interpreted according to the understanding that a reasonable person of
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international contracts:
The parties are considered, unless otherwise agreed, to have impliedly made applicable to
their contract or its formation a usage of which the parties knew or ought to have known and
which in international trade is widely known to, and regularly observed by, parties to
contracts of the type involved in the particular trade concerned.19
An International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) arbitration tribunal posed
an interesting question regarding trade usage in relation to the CISG: Can the
CISG itself be considered a usage of trade and be applied outside the scope
of its direct jurisdiction? Can it be used within domestic law as evidence of
trade usage in the area of international transactions? The tribunal reasoned that
"there is no better source to determine the prevailing trade usages than the
terms of the [CISG]. " 199 As such, the Convention can be implied into
international contracts not only as substantive law but also "as the best
available evidence of international usage of trade."200 The issue in this ICC
arbitration case was the type of notice required regarding the non-conformity
of certain goods. Instead of looking for guidance in the domestic law, the
arbitrators looked to the CISG as a convenient tool to determine customary
notice practice. 201 The two-year statute of limitations provision for giving
notice on nonconformity in the CISG is generally longer than those found in
most domestic laws. 2 2 For example, the Danish Sales Act of 1906 provides
for a one-year limit to raise claims of defects. 23 The statutory period under
the German Civil Code time-bars claims "after only six months."' 4 An
arbitrator or judge may be tempted to choose between the different notice
provisions found in the CISG and domestic law in order to achieve a certain
result. "[T]he Convention may be applied virtually anytime an arbitrator [or
judge] believes that it produces the proper result." 205 The ICC Arbitration
Tribunal adopted just such a position.
The Tribunal finds that there is no better source to determine the prevailing trade usages
than the terms of the [CISG].... This is so even though neither [the buyer nor seller are
from signatory countries]. If they were, the Convention might be applicable to this case as
a matter of law and not only as reflecting trade usages.2"
the same kind as the other party would have had in the same circumstances." Id. (emphasis added).
198. Id. art. 9, para. 2 (emphasis added).
199. Seller v. Buyer, Int'l Comm. Arb. No. 5713 (1989), reprinted in 15 Y.B. COM. ARB. 70
(1990).
200. Ronald A. Brand & Harry M. Flectlner, Arbitration and Contract Formation in International
Trade: First Interpretations of the UN Sales Convention, 12 J.L. & CoM. 239, 258 (1993).
201. The application of the CISG as trade usage in the area of notice on non-conformity was
criticized by Richard Hyland as an improper representation of usage: "[T]he source of CISG's conformity
provisions was not a uniform commercial practice, as found ... in standard terms frequently employed
in international commercial contracts." Richard Hyland, ICC Arbitration Case No. 5713 of 1989, in
KRn'ZER, supra note 9, at 3 (Supp. 9 Apr. 1994) (Case Commentary: France).
202. See CISG, supra note 9, art. 39, para. 2.
203. See Erling Borcher, Denmark, in 1 DOING BUsINEss IN WESTERN EUROPE, supra note 77, at
77, 86; see also id. at 47 (Supp. 1987).
204. von Teichman, supra note 77, at 218.
205. Hyland, supra note 201, at 7.
206. Seller v. Buyer, Int'l Comm. Arb. No. 5713 (1989), reprinted in 15 Y.B. COM. ARB. 70, 72
(1990).
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One commentator asks whether the Convention can provide "para-legal
norms" in contract negotiations and dispute resolution. He concludes that
"general conditions embodied in treaties are regarded as evidence of trade
usage. "207
The seeds for evading domestic laws when it is convenient to do so can
be found in the Danish Sales Act. The rules of the Sales Act are not
immutable and "may be modified by way of agreement or by commercial
usage."208 The recognition of the CISG notice provision as representative
of commercial usage would allow a court to extend the limitations period from
one to two years and thereby prolong the buyer's ability to bring suit. Thus,
the CISG may be seen as a vehicle for a new international law merchant. 2 9
Like the medieval lex mercatoria, it can be seen as "a collection of
usage ... a sort of international custom" 210 that international merchants
may use in their transactions. In the framework of a new international law
merchant, the treatment of comfort instruments under the CISG could lead to
their recognition as enforceable instruments of international custom or usage.
This could result in two regimes of enforceability: one under the decisional
law of a given national system and a second under the CISG.
The Convention may act not only as a source of customary international
law or usage, but also as a vehicle to transform substantive national law. For
example, Norway has enacted the Convention as its domestic law. The
Convention's grounding in generally accepted principles of contract law makes
a reconciliation between the CISG and most national laws a much less
daunting prospect. Jan Hellner sees such a possibility for a convergence of
German law and the CISG: "Since the Convention ... to a large extent
applies general principles of contract to sales, the Convention's substantive
contents can fairly easily be reconciled with the previous principles of German
law, which in the main are also general and abstract."211 Finland and
Sweden have also revised their domestic sales laws in light of the
Convention.212 Developing countries still struggling to formalize their
substantive laws may look to the Convention as an international "model"
statute.2 3 "It provides these countries with a ready-made legal framework
207. NASSAR, supra note 84, at 101.
208. Botcher, supra note 203, at 86.
209. The CISG can be seen as two distinct sources of international law. First, it is formal domestic
law when ratified as an international convention or statute. Second, the CISG can be viewed as evidence
of international customary law. The importance of the latter should not be underrated. "[There are [those]
who ... regard custom as the prior source of international law, if not indeed the sole source."
TEKLEWOLD GEBREHANA, DUTY TO NEGOTIATE: AN ELEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 18 (1978).
210. HENRI PIRENNE, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL EUROPE 53 (1936).
211. Jan Hellner, The UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods: Its Influence on National
Sales and Contract Law, in COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER LAW: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
DIMENSIONs 41, 47 (Ross Cranston & Roy Goode eds., 1993).
212. See id. at 48 ("The Norwegian [Sale of Goods Act] conforms closely to the
Convention .... The Finnish and Swedish statutes are almost identical .... ."); Peter Winship,
Domesticating International Commercial Law: Revising U. C. C. Article 2 in Light of the United Nations
Sales Convention, 37 LoY. L. REV. 43, 46 (1991).
213. The interrelationship between the New International Economic Order and the CISG has been
duly noted. "[O]ne may ask whether the ambitions of developing countries to build a New International
Economic Order ... should not be taken into account in the process of defining the territorial scope of
international business law." DE LY, supra note 125, at 49-50.
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for contracts, which otherwise would take too long to develop."21 4 In the
United States, article 2 of the UCC is being revised. It will be interesting to
see how the revising committee elects to recognize and incorporate the
Convention into the Code. Revising article 2 to eliminate differences between
it and the Convention would help unify U.S. domestic and international sale
of goods laws. The ultimate beneficiary would be the American business
person whose legal transaction costs would be reduced in the current era of
free trade.215
The CISG, like most codes, reflects a recognition of generalized
principles of law. Professor Schmittoff, in making reference to the
development of an international trade law code, notes that it should possess
"principles which should apply to all international trade transactions. ' 26
One can argue that it is the evolution of general principles of law that makes
an international code possible. It is unlikely, however, that a code can create
new principles that will be universally accepted and applied. A code is most
likely to be successful if it recognizes and harmonizes existing general
principles of contract law. For example, despite the Convention's failure to
incorporate a full-fledged good faith requirement, as is found in the UCC,217
such a requirement is likely to be read into the Convention due to its
prevalence in most legal systems. "It has been predicted that the good faith
requirement will mean, at a minimum, that the parties have an affirmative
obligation 'to communicate during performance and to cooperate in the cure
of defects and the modification of obligations in unforeseen
circumstances. "218
B. General Principles of Contract Law Recognized by the CISG
The International Court of Justice recognizes general principles of law
found in the legal systems of all civilized societies as a source of international
law.2"9 This can also be said of contract law, whether referring to civil or
common law. There are universalized principles or norms of contract law that
are found in some form in most national legal systems.220 "Despite the
214. Zwart, supra note 144, at 115.
215. See id. at 92.
216. Clive Schmittoff, The Codification of the Law of International Trade, 1985 J. BUS. L. 34, 42.
217. See U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b) (1989 & Supp. 1996).
218. GUIDE TO THE CISG, supra note 173, at 101.007 (quoting Rosett, supra note 12, at 290).
219. Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice states that international law
includes "the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations." STATUTE OF THE 1ICJ art. 38,
para. 1(c). One commentator lists the following as sources of international business law: (1) standard
forms; (2) customs and trade usage; (3) rules of professional organizations; (4) general principles of law;
(5) codes of conduct; (6) arbitral awards; and (7) international conventions. See DE LY, supra note 125,
at 133.
220. Lord McNair analyzes the concept of general principles of law as it applies to contracts between
companies and governments for the development of natural resources. He concludes that where a nation's
laws are not "sufficiently modernized," choice of law should lead courts to seek out generalized prinicples
of contract law and not a particular national law. "[The system of law most likely to be suitable for the
regulation of [such] contracts... and the adjudication of disputes arising upon them is 'the general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations.'" Lord McNair, The Generalized Principles of Law
Recognized by Civilized Nations, 33 BRIT. Y.B. INT'. L. 1, 19 (1957). Lord McNair notes two possible
candidates for recognition as general principles: unjust enrichment and the principle of acquired rights.
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variety of ways in which the conclusions are reached and articulated, concrete
commercial issues tend to have similar resolutions in [both civil law and
common law] Western systems."" t The arbitration panel in Libyan
American Oil Co. v. Libyan Arab Republic offered a definition of generally
recognized principles: "These general principles are usually embodied in most
recognized legal systems .... They thus form a compendium of legal
precepts and maxims, universally accepted in theory and practice. Instances
of such precepts [include] . . .the principle of sanctity of property and
contracts. "222
The notion of universal rules or norms of contract has been formulated
in many ways. For example, principles of contract law may be motivated by
"the goal of full compensation, the moral convention of promising, a
community's sense of justice, relational and cooperational norms, or the goal
of unification and certainty in international sales contracts."'2 The
meta-principles of good faith, fairness in the exchange, and the duty to inform
are implied by most legal regimes of contract. Viewed expansively, good faith
"imports affirmative obligations on the parties to communicate during
performance and to cooperate in the cure of defects and the modification of
obligations in unforeseen circumstances."224 I now turn to these
meta-principles or norms of contract law.
1. The International Duty of Good Faith
"[G]ood faith is a legal principle that forms an integral part of the rule
pacta sunt servanda. . . . Manner of performance. . . is one of the oldest and
most clearly established of the major elements of the principle in international
law."2"2 The CISG surprisingly did not adopt a specific implied duty of
good faith provision for sale of goods transactions.226 It does, however, state
that the CISG is to be interpreted to promote "the observance of good faith
in international trade."27 Other provisions of the Convention may also be
read to imply a good faith obligation. The statements and conduct of the
See id. at 15-16. Professor Goldstajn argues for the "universal recognition and confirmation of the two
fundamental principles of freedom of contract and pacta sunt servanda." Goldstajn, supra note 113, at 17.
221. Joseph M. Perillo, UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts: The Black
Letter Text and Review, 63 FORDHAM L. REv. 281, 282 (1994); see also Fatouros, supra note 194, at 136
("Any law of contracts, national or international, is bound to start with this principle [of pacta sunt
servanda].").
222. 6 Y.B. COM. ARB. 89, 94 (ad hoc arb. 1981).
223. Amy H. Kastely, The Right to Require Performance in International Sales: Towards an
International Interpretation of the Wenna Convention, 63 WASH. L. REV. 607, 632 (1988).
224. Rosett, supra note 12, at 290.
225. J.F. O'CONNOR, GOOD FAITH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 37 (1991). The preamble to the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties states that "the principles of free consent and of good faith and the
pacta sunt servanda rule are universally recognized." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra
note 188, pmbl.
226. The legislative history of the CISG indicates that its drafters recognized good faith as a
"universally recognized" principle and as a "norm of conduct" in international trade. See Commentary
on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Prepared by the Secretariat,
U.N. Doe. A/CONF.97/5, reprinted in OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON
CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 97/19 (1981).
227. CISG, supra note 9, art. 7, para. 1.
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parties to a contract are to be "interpreted according to the understanding [of]
a reasonable person."' A reasonable person is generally taken to act and
react in a good faith manner. In addition, article 9(2) implies trade usage and
custom into every contract of sale. 29 A strong argument may be made that
good faith is a universal trade usage or custom. From the medieval lex
mercatoria to the present, most specific rules of business can be traced to the
norm of good faith and fair dealing. The duty of good faith is consistent with
the goals of the Convention and may be implied through purposive reading of
its express articles. For example, article 77's express adoption of the duty to
mitigate is consistent with a finding of an implied duty of good faith. 230 The
nonbreaching party's duty to mitigate is the counterpart to the breaching
party's duty of good faith performance.
2. Nationally Recognized Duties of Good Faith
The long-standing obligations of good faith found in national legal
systems23l can also be used in the interpretation and enforcement of
contracts under the CISG. The principle of good faith performance has a
lineage that can be traced to Roman times. The principle was reembraced by
the mercantile community during the eleventh and twelfth centuries. 2 The
notion of good faith performance stemming from Roman law and the lex
mercatoria has been brought forward to the present-day civil codes. The
German Commercial Code, or BGB, voids any agreements or contractual
terms that are considered contra bonos mores, or contrary to the public policy
of good faith."s3 The German Law on General Business Conditions, or
AGB-Gesetz (AGBG) generally holds that a contract provision is void if it
"work[s] to the disadvantage of [a party] in a way irreconcilable with good
faith. ,,34
228. Id. art. 8, para. 2.
229. See id. art. 9, para. 2 ("The parties are considered... to have impliedly made
applicable... a usage... regularly observed by parties to contracts of the type involved in the particular
trade.").
230. See id. art. 77 (stating that nonbreaching party "must take such measures as are reasonable in
the circumstances to mitigate the loss"); see also Kastely, supra note 223, at 621.
231. One commentator has remarked:
[Common and civil law jurisdictions recognize a principle of good faith requiring "fair
dealing, affirmative disclosure of material facts and assistance to others in achieving the free
benefit of contractual relationships. [The good faith concept] is in accordance with the code
of fair play of everyday ethics, is written into the civil codes in almost all civil-law systems
and is thoroughly established in Anglo-American equity. [Furthermore, it can be found as] an
equitable element in the Jewish, Roman, English medieval, Muslim, English modem, Scottish,
American, French, German, Swiss, Belgian, Dutch, Italian, . .. Soviet, Polish, Swedish,
Japanese, and Greek legal systems.
1 GUIDE TO THE CISG, supra note 173, at 101.010 (quoting R. Newman, The General Principles of
Equity, in EQury IN THE WORLD'S LEGAL SYSTEMS 589, 600-08 (R. Newman ed., 1978)).
232. See Jill Pride Anderson, Lender Liability for Breach of the Obligation of Good Faith
Performance, 36 EMORY L.J. 917, 920 (1987).
233. See von Teichnan, supra note 77, at 217. For an excellent examination of the German duty
to negotiate in good faith or the doctine of culpa in contrahendo, see Friedrich Kessler & Edith Fine,
Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining in Good Faith, and Freedom of Contract: A Comparative Study, 77
HARV. L. REV. 401 (1964).
234. von Teichman, supra note 77, at 217.
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The AGBG also provides a number of techniques that can be used in
making a good faith determination. First, if a contract provision
"fundamentally deviates" from the default rules of the BGB, then it may be
considered to have been made in bad faith. Thus, although provisions that are
contrary to the optional rules of the BGB are not directly invalid, they may
be stricken indirectly if they violate the general principle of good faith.
Second, a court will make a "literal and restrictive interpretation" of a
contract clause that was not freely negotiated. 5 This interpretation accords
with the long recognized duty in the civil law to negotiate in good faith,
known as culpa in contrahendo.36 Third, a court can overcome the
presumptive power of a written agreement by considering parol evidence that
leads to a more equitable reading of a harsh contract term. Finally, section
242 of the BGB uses the good faith concept of "basis of the bargain," or
Geschiftsgrundlage, to excuse a party from performing a contract that has
been frustrated 37 In German law, then, there are a number of ways in
which the existence of a good faith excuse for nonperformance may result in
an equitable reformation or a rescission of the contract. "[Tihe courts will in
the first place try to adapt the contract to the new circumstances by re-writing
it in accordance with what they perceive as the parties' intentions and
interests. Only if this fails will the entire contract be declared void.""
In the United States, the concepts of good faith and fair dealing can be
found in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the UCC. Section 1-203
of the UCC states that "every contract or duty within this act imposes an
obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement."" The "macro"
nature of good faith as an overriding principle of contract law has been duly
acknowledged.24 Expansive interpretations of contractual good faith include
good faith in negotiations,24 the duty to cooperate,242 the duty to adjust
from the express terms of the contract,243 and good faith in the termination
235. See generally Kessler & Fine, supra note 233 (comparing duty to negotiate in good faith in
German and American contract law).
236. See id.
237. See von Teichman, supra note 77, at 218.
238. Id.
239. U.C.C. § 1-203(1)(b) (1989 & Supp. 1996).
240. One commentator, for example, has noted: "The general concept of 'good faith' appears in the
U.C.C. as an 'overriding and super-eminent principle.'" Anderson, supra note 232, at 923 (quoting E.
Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 666, 666 (1963)); see also Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract
and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARv. L. REV. 369 (1980) (defining bad faith
as contracting party's attempt to recapture forgone opportunities); Robert S. Summers, "Good Faith" in
General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195
(1968).
241. See, e.g., Nicola W. Palmieri, Good Faith Disclosures Required During Precontractual
Negotiations, 24 SETON HALL L. REv. 70 (1993).
242. See Anderson, supra note 232, at 924 ("[Clooperation among contracting parties to insure that
all parties receive the benefit of their bargain is at the very foundation of the good faith performance
obligation.").
243. Cf. Clayton P. Gillette, Commercial Rationality and the Duty to Adjust Long-Term Contracts,
69 MINN. L. REv. 521 (1985) (examining arguments for requiring adjustment of contractual duties
following unforeseeable event). See generally Richard E. Spiedel, The New Spirit of Contract, 2 J.L. &
COM. 193 (1982) (discussing changes in contract theory); Robert W. Reeder 11, Comment Court-Imposed
Modifications: Supplementing the All-or-Nothing Approach to Discharge Cases, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 1079
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of contractual relations. 2'
The universality of good faith in contract formation and performance is
evident when reviewing the legal regimes of planned or socialist economies.
Private contract law is generally not associated with countries characterized
by state ownership of property and centralized planning, such as the countries
of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe prior to the fall of
communism. Contracts of sale, however, were used in those countries to
facilitate transactions between state-owned agencies.24 Implicit in the notion
of such contractual interchange was the duty of an enterprise to cooperate in
concluding contracts and to "perform its obligations with due care."246
These duties to cooperate and to act in good faith were required because all
agencies were obligated to work toward goals stated in national economic
plans.247 Thus, failure to act in good faith was viewed as harming not only
the other contracting party but also the state itself. Failure to perform or to
provide defective goods therefore resulted in the assessment of penalties not
necessarily related to actual damages. The penalties were intended to be
punitive and not primarily compensatory.248 A party acting in bad faith was
subject to damage claims in excess of those granted under the Hadley
foreseeability principle found in the common law.249 Thus, the concept of
good faith played an important role in the contract law of Eastern Europe and
the Soviet Union.
This review of national laws demonstrates that good faith in the
performance and enforcement of contracts is recognized by a broad range of
national legal systems. °50 These national good faith requirements can be
brought to bear on CISG-governed contracts in two ways. First, the
Convention specifically excludes from its scope governance over "the validity
of contracts. "" However, we have seen that in most national legal systems
bad faith negotiation or performance will void a provision in a contract that
was produced by the bad faith act. Thus, national law may continue to
(1983) (discussing court-imposed contract modifications).
244. See generally Robert A. Hillman, An Analysis of the Cessation of Contractual Relations, 68
CORNELL L. REv. 617 (1983).
245. See Goldstajn, supra note 113, at 16 ("Although more or less restricted by state planning,
individual problems of commodity production and marketing exist in Eastern Europe. The private law of
contract ... applies.").
246. LAW AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN SOCIALIST COUNTRIES 154 (Gyula Edrise & Attila Harmathy
eds., 1971). "[S]ocialist enterprises have the obligation to co-operate in concluding contracts and in their
performance, taking into account the tasks resulting from national economic plans." Id. at 158.
247. See Zwart, supra note 144, at 114 ("The main function of contracts in socialist countries is to
help the state fulfill its national plans. Contract law.., is therefore characterized by general
principles ... [such as] the principle of 'socialist cooperation.'").
248. See LAW AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, supra note 246, at 157
("Conventional penalties in socialist trade are conceived as sanctions against the party obliged who is not
performing its obligations properly.").
249. See Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341 (Eng. 1854) (holding that contract damages must be
reasonably foreseeable).
250. Professor Schmittoff suggests that the obligation of good faith should be codified into
international law. See Schmittoff, supra note 216, at 41-42 ("[Certain principles.., should apply to all
international trade transactions... e.g., the obligation of good faith in the performance and enforcement
of an international contract.").
251. CISG, supra note 9, art. 4(a).
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determine the impact of bad faith upon the validity of a contract. Second, as
discussed above, article 9 of the CISG allows for the consideration of
international trade usage. In sum, it is likely that national principles of good
faith will be applied to CISG contracts."52
3. Fairness in the Exchange
In Contract and Fair Exchange,253 Professor Atiyah examines the
common law's shift from the undaunting allegiance to freedom of contract in
classical contracts theory to the "modem growth of statutory interventions in
contract law ... designed. to ensure substantive fairness in the
exchange."' Fairness in the exchange has also increasingly been accepted
as a major norm or principle of contract law at the supranational level. One
commentator on international commercial contracts predicts a continuing shift
from the principle of sanctity of contract to fairness in the exchange:
Though the principle of sanctity remains strong, relational elements are on the
rise.. . . [There has been] a major shift towards relationalism and a recognition of equitable
considerations. Principles of equity have been fully recognized with respect to the duties of
good faith, renegotiation, and gap-filling. . . The doctrines of good faith and fair dealing
are integral parts of contract law. It, therefore, can be concluded that, thoughfairness might
not be the sole aim of contract law, it is certainly its underlying basis and one of its major
objectives. 5
The notion of fairness in the exchange has been traced to the natural law
philosophy of Hugo Grotiuss 6 and Samuel Pufendorf. 7 This philosophy
recognized contractual fairness as a relevant factor in the enforceability of
contract. 8 The norm of fairness provides an umbrella for a number of
doctrines that revolve around the substantive fairness of the exchange. The
civil law's notion of just contracts 9 and the common law doctrine of
unconscionability2" come within the fairness penumbra. The divergence
between the common law and the civil law in the area of substantive fairness
may be merely one of semantics. For example, under article 1674 of the
252. Professor Kastely concludes that "although the principle of good faith is not clearly defined and
its placement in the Convention is problematic, it is appropriate to interpret the rights to
performance... consistently with a general obligation of good faith." Kastely, supra note 223, at 619-20.
253. P.S. Atiyah, Contract and Fair Exchange, 35 U. TORONTO L.J. 1 (1985).
254. Id. at 3.
255. NASSAR, supra note 84, at 234 (emphasis added).
256. See, e.g., HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE (F.W. Kelsey trans., 1925).
257. See, e.g., 2 SAMUEL PUFBNDORF, DE JuRE NATURAE Er GENTIiM [THE LAW OF NATURE AND
NATIONS] (C.H. Oldfather & W.A. Oldfather trans., 1934).
258. See NASSAR, supra note 84, at 7 ("[Ihe arguments of fairness, good faith, and change of
circumstances were generally recognized by natural [law] lawyer[s].").
259. See generally John W. Baldwin, The Medieval Theories of the Just Price, 49 AM. PHIL. SOC'Y
2 (1959); Raymond de Roover, The Concept of the Just Price: Theory and Economic Policy, 18 J. ECON.
HIST. 418 (1958). Just price evolved from the Roman law notion ofjustumpretium. See James Gordley,
Equality in Exchange, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1587 (1981)(noting "the ancient idea that in an exchange the value
of what each party gives should be equal to the value of what he receives").
260. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981); U.C.C. § 2-302 (1994); see also
Andrew Burgess, Consumer Adhesion Contracts and Unfair Terms: A Critique of Current Theory and a
Suggestion, ANGLO-AM. L. REv. 255 (1986); Leff, supra note 174.
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French Civil Code, an agreed price that is inadequate by more than
seven-twelfths of the value of a good may be rescinded by the seller. The
purchaser then has the option of "paying the balance of the just price"26" ' or
returning the goods.
In contrast, inequality of exchange is not a ground for rescission under
the common law.262 A common law contract need only be supported by
some mutuality of consideration. It need not be characterized by an equality
or adequacy of consideration. "[A] contract does not lack mutuality merely
because its terms are harsh or its obligations unequal."263 The common law
premise is that value is to be determined by the parties and is not the proper
subject for judicial reformation on grounds of inadequacy of
consideration. 2" However, it should be noted that in the area of equitable
relief, the common law is closer to the civil law's notion of just contract.
While a court faced with a contract of unequal exchange is required to enforce
it and assess damages accordingly, that same court faced with the same
contract is free to deny a claim for specific performance because of the
inequality of the exchange.265 Section 364 of the Second Restatement
expressly states that specific performance should be denied if "the exchange
is grossly inadequate or the terms of the contract are otherwise unfair. "266
Furthermore, despite the general common law principle that courts shall
not set aside a contract due to inequality or inadequacy of consideration, there
has been a long-standing exception when the inequality is deemed significant.
The 1882 case of Wolford v. Powers states the common law exception:
"Where the [consideration] is so grossly inadequate as to shock the
conscience, courts will interfere."'267 This notion of substantive fairness is
the cornerstone of fairness in the exchange inquiries. Under the civil law's
notion of just price, this analysis should theoretically be applied before any
contract is enforced. In contrast, the voiding or reformation of a contract in
the common law on grounds of unfairness is considered an extraordinary
remedy. Yet, the enlargement of notions of substantive unfairness or
261. C. civ. art. 1681 (Fr.). The buyer may reduce the just price by ten percent. Id. Evidently, the
purchaser is entitled to a good bargain but not too good a bargain. See id.
262. See, e.g., Batsakis v. Demotsis, 226 S.W.2d 673, 675 (Tex. 1949) ("Mere inadequacy of
consideration will not void a contract."); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 (1981)
(concerning adequacy of consideration and mutuality of obligation).
263. Meurer Steel Barrel Co. v. Martin, 1 F.2d 687, 688 (3d Cir. 1924). Professor Newman noted
that the common law's historical indifference to inequality in the exchange is an aberration: "[T]he
conclusion is unavoidable that the Anglo-American legal system is the only important system other than
Islamic law incorporating the doctrine that contracts unfairly obtained or unfairly pressed for performance
will be enforced in damages" and not be given specific performance. Ralph A. Newman, The Renaissance
of Good Faith in Contracting in Anglo-American Law, 54 CORNELL L. REv. 553, 554 (1969).
264. See Wolford v. Powers, 85 Ind. 294, 303 (1882) ("If... there is any consideration for a
promise, it must be sufficient for the one made; for, if this be not so, then the result is that the court
substitutes its own judgment for that of the promisor, and, in doing this, makes a new contract.").
265. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 358 (1982).
266. Id. § 364(l)(c).
267. Wolford, 85 Ind. at 301. The seminal American case on unconscionability is Williams v.
Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). It states the traditional test for
unconscionability. An unconscionable contract is one that "no man in his senses and not under delusion
would make on the one hand, and no honest or fair man would accept, on the other." Id. at 450 n.12
(quoting Greer v. Tweed, 13 Abb. Pr. (n.s.) 427, 429 (N.Y.C.P. 1872)).
CISG and the Presumption of Enforceability
unconscionability has helped narrow the gap between the civil and common
law and between legal and equitable remedies.268 For example, the court in
Girard Trust Bank v. Castle Apartments, Inc.269 seemed to adopt the litmus
test of the medieval just price theorist: "[If [the] value is more than twice the
sale price, there is such gross inadequacy as will shock the conscience of the
Court and justify setting the sale aside. "270
Often the substantive unfairness of a contract is a result of a weakness in
the bargaining process.27' In Vockner v. Erickson272 an elderly woman
entered into a contract for the sale of her apartment building. The contract
provided for a purchase money mortgage with a monthly payment that was so
low that it failed to cover the interest owing on the deed of trust. She would
have had to wait until the age of 103 for a thirty-year balloon payment to
mature in order to receive the bulk of the money. The court held that the
payment terms were unconscionable but elected to reform them instead of
striking them entirely. It held that the "aim of reformation in these
circumstances is to bring the contract in conformity with minimum standards
of conscionability."273
In order to strike a contract, an American court is likely to focus on
factors that indicate that the stronger party exploited the "gross inequality of
bargaining power."274 The simple fact of disparity in bargaining positions,
however, is insufficient to render a contract unconscionable: "Superior
bargaining power alone without the element of unreasonableness does not
permit a finding of unconscionability or unfairness."275 The court in
Tuzlowitzki v. Atlantic Richfield Co. considered the usage and customs of the
particular trade in order to determine if a contract term was unreasonable.
"The business practices-of-the-community test asks whether the terms are so
extreme as to appear unconscionable according to the mores and business
practices of the time and place."276 The court held on the basis of this test
that a termination provision in a gas station dealership agreement was "not
atypical in the local business community"277 and therefore was not
268. The Second Restatement provides:
rTypes of unfairness] involve elements of substantive unfairness in the exchange itself or in
its terms that fall short of... unconscionability .... The gradual expansion of these
doctrines to afford relief in an increasing number of cases has resulted in a contraction of the
area in which this traditional distinction is made between the availability of equitable and legal
relief.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 364 cmt. a (1981).
269. 379 A.2d 1144 (Del. Super. Ct. 1977).
270. Id. at 1145 (quoting Central Nat'l Bank v. Industrial Trust Co., 51 A.2d 854 (Del. Super. Ct.
1947)).
271. See Newman, supra note 263, at 558 ("If... the disparity between purchase price and market
value is great. . . the inadequacy of the consideration might raise a presumption of fraud which would
preclude relief in either specific performance or damages.").
272. 712 P.2d 379 (Alaska 1986).
273. Id. at 384 (emphasis added).
274. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. d (1981).
275. Tuzlowitzki v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 396 A.2d 956 (Del. 1978); see also J.A. Jones Constr.
Co. v. City of Dover, 372 A.2d 540 (Del. 1977).
276. Tuzlowitzli, 396 A.2d at 960 (emphasis added); see also Gordon v. Crown Cent. Petroleum
Corp., 423 F. Supp. 58 (N.D. Ga. 1976), aff'd, 564 F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1977).
277. Tuzlowitzki, 396 A.2d at 960.
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unconscionable despite the disparity in bargaining positions. It is still
unresolved whether less than a "gross disparity in the values exchanged"2 7
will be sufficient for a common law court to interfere under the rubric of
fairness in the exchange. It is clear, however, that an unfair contract in which
one party does not take unreasonable advantage of the other is less likely to
be reformed. To provide reformation in such a case would be
"[Anglo-American] contract theory pushing beyond current substantive
unconscionability [and] beyond medieval just-price doctrine. 
2 79
Nevertheless, some level of fairness in the exchange "constitutes a principle
of current international practice [and] is regarded as an underlying principle
of international commitments and arbitral awards."280
4. Duty To Notify
The duty to notify the other party under various situations can also be
seen as a generally accepted contract principle found in domestic laws. Notice
obligations surface in a number of places along the transactional time line,
including anticipatory nonperformance, request for additional time, notice of
nonconformity, and notice of contract avoidance. Under Swiss law, the buyer
must inspect the goods purchased "as soon as it is feasible."28 t If defects are
found, the buyer must "immediately" notify the seller of the defects. "If the
buyer fails to so notify recognizable defects, the goods purchased are deemed
to have been accepted."282 The German Civil Code imposes a similar duty
of prompt inspection and notification.283 Failure to fulfill these obligations
results in the waiver of the buyer's right of rejection based upon deficiencies
in the goods.
Given the relatively short statute of limitation periods found in some
national laws, the requirement of prompt notification is very important. For
example, the statutory period under the German Civil Code is only six
months.' Under the Danish Sales Act of 1906, or Kobeloven, the buyer
must advise the seller of defects within a twelve-month period from the
delivery of the goods.285 The Belgian and French Civil Code's title
provisions are particularly idiosyncratic. Generally, ownership passes upon the
signing of the contract; however, an exception is made for wine and other
goods in "which it is customary to taste before purchasing."286 There is no
sale or duty to notify until the buyer has had an opportunity to taste the goods.
Third World countries have generally been concerned that strict notice
278. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 208 cmt. c (1981).
279. Amy H. Kastely, Cogs or Cyborgs?: Blasphemy and Irony in Contract Theories, 90 Nw. U.
L. REv. 132, 176 (1995).
280. NASSAR, supra note 84, at 170.
281. Claus Schellenberg & Karl Arnold, Switzerland, in I DOING BUSINESS IN WESTERN EUROPE,
supra note 77, at 387, 397.
282. Id.
283. See, e.g., § 496 BGB (F.R.G.).
284. See id. § 477(1).
285. See Henri-Robert Depret, Belgium, in DOING BUSINESS IN WESTERN EUROPE, supra note 77,
at 41, 47 (Supp. 1987).
286. C. cmv. art. 1587 (BeIg.); C. ClV. art. 1587 (Fr.).
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requirements could be used by more sophisticated business persons to avoid
liability for defects in their products.287 Thus, the good faith nature implicit
in the duty to notify was adopted in the notification requirements of the CISG.
In order to placate opponents, the maximum time limit of two years to notify
is longer than what is found in most national laws of sale.288
C. New Contractual Informalities Recognized by the CISG
In comparing the CISG with the common law and the UCC, the most
obvious difference is the degree of informality found in the CISG. This
informality will be analyzed from three perspectives: writing requirements, the
battle of the forms, and oral modifications of contracts. The importance of
choice of law clauses will be analyzed as an aside.
1. Writing Requirements
The UCC requires that any sale of goods for a price of $500 or more
must be evidenced by "some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for
sale has been made between the parties."28 9 Furthermore, the writing must
be "signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought." 2' The
sanctity of the written contract is protected by the common law and the
UCC's parol evidence rule. This rule provides that a written agreement cannot
be "contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous
oral agreement."2 91
In contrast, the CISG adopts the view of many of the civil law countries
that a writing is not a required formality to the finding of a contract. Article
11 states that a "contract need not be... evidenced by writing."2 9 The
lack of a writing requirement is coupled with the admissibility of any evidence
that may bear on the issue of formation. Proof of a contract or of the terms
within a contract may be given "by any means, including witnesses. "293
The lack of a writing requirement creates a much greater potential under
the CISG than under the UCC for liability for representations made during the
negotiation phase. "Under [the] CISG ... any relevant statement made in
negotiations prior to the signing of the contract [is] admissible into
evidence. "294 In contrast, the UCC's parol evidence rule integrates prior
statements, written or oral, into the final written contract. A seller could avoid
warranty liability for representations made during the precontract phase by not
memorializing them in the written form. Under the CISG, however, prior oral
287. See Zwart, supra note 144, at 118-20.
288. See CISG, supra note 9, art. 39.
289. U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (1994). As between merchants, a written confirmation subsequent to an oral
agreement is sufficient to satisfy the writing requirements. Id. § 2-201(2). There is a specific exception
for specially manufactured goods. Id. § 2-201(3)(a).
290. Id. § 2-201(1).
291. Id. § 2-202.
292. CISG, supra note 9, art. 11.
293. Id. (emphasis added).
294. John E. Murray, Jr., Different Laws Might Apply to Foreign Buys Under the United Nations
Convention for the International Sale of Goods, PuRcHAsING, Oct. 19, 1995, at 30.
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representations regarding quality and performance would be enforceable. This
raises the potential for unwanted liability for comfort instruments. The
unsophisticated business person could be trapped if she believed that any oral
or informal comfort would only create a binding obligation if confirmed in
writing.
The requirements to form a contract are further complicated by the fact
that articles 12 and 96 of the Convention allow a contracting state to opt out
of the oral agreement provision. Furthermore, countries whose domestic law
requires a sales contract to be in writing may opt out of article 11. As a
result, a party contracting internationally must inquire not only whether the
other party is a resident of a CISG country, but also whether that country has
opted out of article l."295
2. The Battle of the Forms
An American party familiar with the UCC can be exposed to unexpected
liability due to the battle of the forms. Article 19 of the CISG resolves the
battle of the forms dilemma differently than section 2-207 of the UCC.296
A hypothetical involving the addition of a term in an offeree's response will
illustrate the comparative complexities. Suppose that a seller responds to a
purchase order (offer) with a confirming invoice. The confirming invoice,
however, includes an additional term that limits the ability of the buyer to
notify the seller of product defects. What is the legal effect of the additional
notice term? The term's legal effect will turn on whether such a modification
of the CISG notice provision would materially alter the contract offer. If it
were construed as a nonmaterial modification, the CISG and the UCC both
would acknowledge a contract that incorporated the offeree's modification.
However, if the additional term were considered to be material, the two laws
would dictate different conclusions. The CISG would not recognize a contract
in this case because the modification would be construed as converting the
would-be acceptance into a counteroffer. The UCC, in contrast, would have
found a contract under the material terms presented in the original offer. The
modification of the notice provision would be stricken.
A German court, in fact, held that such a modification was
nonmaterial.297 This is a surprising decision given that most commentators
have interpreted article 19 of the CISG as a rejection of the UCC approach
295. As of this writing, at least eight countries have formally opted out: Argentina, Chile, People's
Republic of China, Russia, Belorussia, Estonia, Hungary, and Ukraine. See KRrrZER, supra note 9 (Supps.
7-10 Sept. 1993, Apr. 1994 & July 1994). Interestingly, most of the countries opting out have had
socialist legal regimes. The United States has elected not to opt out in favor of the writing requirements
of the UCC. Thus, lack of formality, such as nonadherence to the statute of frauds, would not protect an
American company from unexpected liability. "[F]or companies doing business in the United States under
the CISG, there is no statute of frauds writing requirement." 1 GUIDE TO THE CISG, supra note 173, at
101.002.
296. See HENRY GABRIEL, PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO THE CISG AND THE UCC 59-63 (1994)
(stating that CISG effectively requires "mirror image," whereas UCC allows "battle of forms").
297. See Journal of Law and Commerce Case 11, 12 J.L. & COM. 277, 277 (1993) (summarizing
facts and holding and translating text of German case Landgericht, Baden-Baden, 1991-40 113/90 (Aug.
14, 1991)).
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in favor of a mirror image rule.298 This interpretation of article 19 rests on
the assumption that the CISG's definition of materiality would be broadly
construed. Unlike the UCC, which restricts materiality to a few fundamental
terms, the Convention provides an expansive list of contract terms that are to
be construed as being material. It states that terms "relating, among other
things, to the price, payment, quality and quantity of the goods, place and
time of delivery, extent of one party's liability to the other, or the settlement
of disputes are considered to alter the terms of the offer materially." 299 The
modification of the notice term would thus seem to come within the umbrella
of events that impact the "extent of one party's liability to the other." 3" The
German court decision is evidence that until the jurisprudence surrounding the
CISG is solidified, contracting parties are likely to be surprised by some of
the results produced by national courts interpreting the Convention. In the
area of comfort instruments, the materiality of the assurance to the underlying
transaction is likely to be a pivotal factor in the enforceability determination.
3. Oral Modifications
This clear difference between common law formalities and the CISG is
further complicated by article 29 of the Convention, which enforces an
agreement that all modifications to a contract must be in writing. What if the
parties orally agree that any future modifications must be in writing? The
spirit of article 11 of the CISG would indicate that such an oral agreement
would be as provable and enforceable as any other contractual term.301
Although article 29(2) may be interpreted to require that such an agreement
be in writing, 2 one could argue that an oral agreement with respect to the
requirements for modification is equally binding and in conformity with the
spirit of the informality that article 11 represents.
The Convention's article on modification and its interpretation may have
an impact upon the enforceability of comfort instruments made subsequent to
the formation of a contract. Two issues could arise in conjunction with the use
of such instruments to clarify conflicting positions or to assure a party of
continuing performance. First, does the use of a comfort instrument to clarify
or to assure constitute a contractual modification? Second, if such a
modification is intended, does it need to be in writing? The second issue has
already been addressed above. The first issue was addressed outside the
context of the CISG in the American case of Chelsea Industries v. Accuracy
298. See, e.g., GABRIEL, supra note 296, at 59 ("The CISG adopts the traditional common law rule
that the acceptance be a 'mirror image' of an offer.").
299. CISG, supra note 9, art. 19, para. 3 (emphasis added). One commentator's response to the
broad phraseology of this paragraph is that "almost any alteration is material." GABRIEL, supra note 296,
at 60.
300. CISG, supra note 9, art. 19, para. 3.
301. Article 29(1) illustrates another difference between Anglo-American law and the Convention.
It states that a contract may be modified "by the mere agreement of the parties." Id. art. 29, para. 1.
Thus, a modification of a contract under the CISG need not be supported by new consideration.
302. Id. art. 29, para. 2 ("A contract in writing which contains a provision requiring any
modification or termination by agreement to be in writing may not be otherwise modified.").
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Leasing Corp.3 3 A lessee under an equipment leasing agreement asked the
lessor about a purchase option. In response, the leasing company wrote a
letter stating that it was its "policy ... to convert on stated terms"3" the
lease to a purchase contract. The leasing company argued that the policy letter
was only a statement of current policy and was intended to be a nonbinding
comfort letter. The court disagreed and held that the letter became a part of
the total agreement and was a contractually binding promise. The CISG's
modification provisions thus contribute to decisions regarding comfort letter
enforceability.
4. Choice of Law
The United States has two laws of contracts: a state law of contracts,
represented by the UCC, and a "federal" law of contracts, the CISG. It has
long been the rule in the United States that there is no general federal
common law.305 The common law remains the domain of the states under
a Constitution that restricts the authority of the federal government to
enumerated powers. However, when the federal government preempts state
law by way of statute or treaty, it effectively rewrites that portion of state
law. The Supreme Court affirmed this principle in Hauenstein v. Lynham:30 6
"[L]aws and treaties of the United States are as much a part of the law of
every state as its own local laws. "3 7 This becomes important when a U.S.
citizen attempts to opt out of the Convention through, for example, a choice
of law clause. Once again the unwary business person may become trapped
in the quagmire of conflicts of law. Suppose a choice of law clause states that
the "law of the State of New York" shall apply to any disputes arising out of
a contract. What law shall apply: New York's version of the UCC or the
CISG? The CISG appears to be the better answer because it is the law of the
State of New York in cases in which the contracting parties are from different
countries that are both signatories to the Convention. Alternatively, if the
court's conflict of law rules refer it to the law of New York, a strong
argument arises once again that the CISG preempts the UCC. This will be the
case whether the contract is signed in New York or abroad. It will also be the
case in contracts involving a foreign company doing business in New York,
even if the contract is to be performed within the state. All that is needed is
for the parties to have their primary places of business in two countries that
are signatories to the Convention.0 8
An ancillary issue is whether a court should admit evidence to rebut the
presumption that favors federal law. The parol evidence rule of the UCC
would probably preclude such oral admissions in favor of the court's own
303. 699 F.2d 58 (1st Cir. 1983).
304. Id. at 61.
305. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
306. 100 U.S. 483 (1880).
307. Id. at 490.
308. See CISG, supra note 9, art. 1, para. 1(a). It should be noted that the United States opted out
of article l(1)(b), which would mandate the application of the CISG in certain situations where only one
of the parties is from a signatory country. See U.N. Doe. A/CN/91294 (1987).
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interpretation of the words of the contract. In contrast, a court applying the
rules of evidence suggested by the CISG would admit evidence showing the
parties intended that the UCC govern the case. To avoid this uncertainty in
the choice of law, the contracting parties should choose their words carefully
when opting out of the Convention. In our hypothetical, the correct
phraseology would be that the law to be applied is the "Uniform Commercial
Code as adopted by the State of New York as of the date of the contract or
as subsequently amended." The choice of law determination is especially
important with respect to comfort instrument enforceability. Under current
U.S. law, the informality of such instruments, coupled with their inherently
ambiguous language, is likely to result in a finding of nonenforceability. A
choice of law rule, however, that directs a court to a foreign national law or
to the CISG may result in a different holding.
As parties become more knowledgeable and comfortable with the
provisions, they may expand the CISG's jurisdiction by private agreement.
The law applicable to a given international contract is often determined by an
express choice of law clause. Commercial parties have often compromised in
choice of law negotiations and forum selection clauses by choosing venues and
national laws that are considered fair and advanced. For example, the London
Court of International Trade and the International Chamber of Commerce's
Paris-based Arbitration Panel are popular compromises for contracting parties
from divergent legal systems. This has also been the case regarding Swiss
commercial law: "Swiss commercial law appears to be acceptable to parties
from different legal backgrounds."3"9 The straightforward and uncomplicated
nature of Swiss law has made it an appealing compromise for-choice of law
in contract negotiations.310 Other popular choices of law in international
contract dispute resolution include English, U.S., French, German, and
Swedish laws.31 It will be interesting to see if the CISG becomes an
alternative choice of law. Parties may see it-as a compromise law to govern
contracts not within their jurisdiction.
The remainder of this Article will more carefully analyze the potential
impact of the CISG on comfort letter enforceability. Part IV will examine the
underlying principles of the CISG and foreign cases that apply the CISG to
understand how such courts may deal with comfort instrument enforceability.
It concludes with a prediction that it is likely to impact the common law
presumption of nonenforceability. Part V will look to the future relevance of
the CISG to the internationalization of contract law and to the creation of a
uniform jurisprudence for comfort instrument enforceability. It concludes with
some advice to American business persons for avoiding unintended contractual
liability.
309. Schellenberg & Arnold, supra note 281, at 397.
310. See id.
311. See NASSAR, supra note 84, at 35 ("London, New York, Paris, Geneva, and Zurich are the
most popular arbitration centers. Their respective laws, in addition to German law, are also the most
frequently applied in dispute resolution."); B. Blair Crawford, Drafting Considerations Under the 1980
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 8 J.L. & COM. 187, 189
(1988) ("The usual compromise is the law of (and often a forum in) some 'neutral' third country such as
Sweden or Switzerland . ").
1997]
YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 22: 111
IV. THE CISG AND COMFORT LETTER ENFORCEABILITY
How comfort instruments are originally interpreted under the CISG by a
court of first impression will play a key role in determining their
enforceability. That court will face the daunting task of harmonizing the
divergence in the world's different legal systems regarding comfort instrument
enforceability. Moreover, how foreign courts recognize such an opinion will
determine whether the original interpretation will gain universal precedential
value. The courts are likely to look to general principles of contract law for
guidance in determining the enforceability of these business instruments. As
we have seen, the principles of good faith and fairness in the exchange are
widely accepted norms of contract law. Ancillary norms include compensation
for justifiable reliance, the belief that one should keep her promises, and the
justice-promoting concept of equalizing the exchange. If a party agrees to a
seemingly one-sided agreement based on its reliance on a third party
assurance, then a court may feel inclined to enforce the assurance as a way
of equalizing the underlying agreement. The hard use of comfort instruments
to motivate a party to enter into an agreement, followed by refusal to provide
such comfort, could be construed under the German AGBG, for example, as
something that "works to the disadvantage of a party in a way irreconcilable
with good faith."312 Clearly, the bad faith use of comfort instruments by
hard bargainers should subject them to a claim for foreseeable reliance
damages. Finally, the great stock that international business persons place on
the duty to notify can be applied, by analogy, to comfort instruments. If a
comfort issuer's defense is that there has been a policy change subsequent to
the issuance of the comfort letter, then at the very least she should be required
to notify the other party of that policy change. This would allow the receivers
of comfort instruments to seek other assurances in order to protect themselves.
A. General Principles and Enforceability
The enforceability of quasi-contractual and preliminary instruments has
long been debated. The line between contract and pre-contract or noncontract
has never been precisely fixed.3"3 Courts have at times rescued those who
relied upon noncontractual instruments by using flexible concepts such as
promissory estoppel and good faith to give recourse to those whose claims
would have been precluded by one of contract law's formalities. The
uncertainty of liability is compounded in the area of international contracts
because of variations in contractual formalities among different legal systems.
For example, an American business person can rely on the statute of frauds
to avoid incurring liability when giving an oral assurance or representation.
In contrast, a verbal guaranty or assurance is more likely to be enforced under
312. §§ 157, 242 HGB (F.R.G.).
313. See, e.g., E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair
Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217 (1987); Charles L. Knapp, Enforcing the
Contract to Bargain, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 673, 673-76 (1969); G. Richard Shell, Opportunism and Trust
in the Negotiation of Commercial Contracts: Toward a New Cause of Action, 44 VAND. L. REV. 221,
232-34 (1991).
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the CISG and in some legal systems, such as Germany's. The party seeking
enforcement of a comfort letter or an oral assurance would need to show that
the parties' actions would indicate to a reasonable person that an agreement
had been made or that an intent to be bound had been given.
It should be noted, however, that the importance of the statute of frauds
in Anglo-American jurisprudence is often overstated. The lack of a writing or
the lack of a final, integrated expression of agreement has rarely prevented a
court from admitting evidence in order to fill in gaps in a contract.
[The finding of an] agreement should not be frustrated where it is possible to reach a
reasonable and fair result. In the final analysis, a contract becomes enforceable against the
objection of apparent uncertainty . . . by resorting to objective external standards, or
commercial practice, or other usage or custom fairly shown to be within the contemplation
of the parties.
314
Thus, when the parties contemplate a final written agreement, the court may
find a contract prior to its final integration: "[T]he mere fact that the parties
contemplate memorializing their agreement in a formal document does not
prevent their informal agreement from taking effect prior to that event."315
Letters of intent and agreements in principle have long tested the ability
of American courts to differentiate between contract and mere negotiation.
"The 'agreement in principle' may be based on a handshake understanding or
memorialized in a preliminary letter of intent."316 Parties may take three
views toward preliminary agreements, letters of intent, comfort instruments,
and other inchoate agreements. 317 First, a party may believe that she is not
legally bound until a formal writing is signed, despite an oral agreement or
assurance. Second, a party may believe that a more formal writing is a mere
formality and that the informal instruments or oral assurances are legally
binding. If these oral assurances offered in the "precontractual" negotiation
constitute misrepresentation, they can result in both moral and legal
recrimination.18 Often the morality of enforcement is equivalent to the
legality of enforcement. Indeed, unethical conduct or promises have created
legal causes of action. 319 Third, the party may think that the preliminary
agreement formalizes the parties' intent to enter into a final agreement
pending successful negotiations by their attorneys and other representatives.
The party may believe, however, that failure by these representatives to
finalize the terms of the agreement releases the principals from their good
faith intentions to enter into a formal, binding agreement.
314. Mid-Continent Tel. Corp. v. Home Tel. Co., 319 F. Supp. 1176, 1192 (N.D. Miss. 1970).
315. V'Soske v. Barwick, 404 F.2d 495, 499 (2d Cir. 1968).
316. Temkin, supra note 81, at 125 (citation omitted). Temkin categorizes exchanges in the area of
corporate acquistions into three types: preliminary negotiations, definitive agreement, and agreement in
principle. See id. at 127.
317. See id. at 129 n.15.
318. For an examination of the ethics of negotiations, see Gerald B. Welaufer, Tze Ethics of Lying
in Negotiations, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1219 (1990).
319. The moral basis of promissorial enforcement was stated by Professor Linzer: "The origins of
enforcement may be religious, or religion may have been used to achieve utility, but I think that today
most people believe that one should stand by one's word." Peter Linzer, On the Amorality of Contract
Remedies-Efficiency, Equity, and the Second Restatement, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 111, 138 (1981) (citations
omitted).
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These various views have found expression in American court decisions.
A number of courts have ruled that any negotiation not resulting in a formal
agreement allows each of the parties to withdraw-whether in good or bad
faith.320 Other "courts have held the withdrawing party liable as if a fully
negotiated contract to consummate the transaction already existed.""32 The
enforceability of preliminary agreements and correspondences therefore
remains unclear. It is clear, however, that reliance theory has been used to
expand the contractual liability net into areas of precontract or
quasi-contractual instruments in ways not previously seen.322 This expansion
of contractual liability is likely to include international contract negotiations
and the use of comfort instruments.
Recent changes in modem international transactions have led to an increased reliance on
precontractual instruments. Commercial transactions are increasingly consummated between
parties of diverse cultural and legal traditions. Parties are often unfamiliar with the ethical
and legal ramifications of the negotiating process in other countries, which may lead the
parties to write out their goals at a relatively early stage of the negotiation.
Given this tendency to use precontractual agreements, "the primary question
becomes whether the relevant community would accord binding force to the
[instrument]. "324 Ultimately, the potential for liability in the area of
precontract or in the area of comfort instruments will be determined by
commercial practice. It is recognized that "[s]imilarities of contract practice
and contract law are due to common commercial needs shared by all who
participate in international trade transactions." 3" The more such instruments
are a product of hard bargaining and the more contracting parties rely on
them, the greater the likelihood of contractual liability.
B. A Case Study: The Italian Shoe Cases
The enforceability of comfort instruments under the Convention is not
likely to be determined in the near future. The lack of clarity regarding the
enforceability of these instruments under national legal systems provides little
guidance as to the likelihood of enforceability under the Convention.
Nonetheless, the aids of interpretation used under the civil law system may be
applied in order to predict a possible judicial response. The Italian Civil Code
of 1942 provides the means of interpretation that analogously applies to the
Convention's dictate that its articles are to be interpreted originally:
In interpreting the [Convention], no other meaning can be attributed to it than that made
clear by the actual significance of the words according to the connection between them, and
320. See, e.g., Belcher v. Import Cars, Ltd., 246 So. 2d 584, 586 (Fla. 1971).
321. Temkin, supra note 81, at 130.
322. The unleashing of promissorial and reliance-based liability from the confines of assumpsit
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is based upon a simple philosophy that it is right for one
to receive the performance that was promised.
323. Klein & Bachechi, supra note 104, at 8 (citations omitted).
324. Id. at 11.
325. Harold J. Berman, The Law of International Commercial Transactions (Lex Mercatoria), 2
EMORY J. INT'L Disp. RESOL. 235, 235-36 (1988).
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by the intention of the [drafters]. If a controversy cannot be decided by a precise provision,
consideration is given to provisions that regulate similar cases or analogous matters; if the
case still remains in doubt, it is decided abcording to the general principles [on which the
Convention is based] .32
There is no article within the Convention that specifically deals with
precontractual liability or with liability stemming from informal instruments
of business such as comfort letters. Instead, liability will have to be premised
on a composite of relevant articles of the Convention. The creation of the
composite should be guided by the founding principles of the Convention and
general principles of contract law previously discussed.
A number of German cases dealing with contracts for the importation of
Italian products offer a preview of the CISG in action. These German cases
dealt with the issues of implying contract terms and satisfying the notice of
nonconformity requirement.
1. Implication of Terms
A German court of appeals held a misuse of specifications by an Italian
shoe manufacturer to be a fundamental breach.327 The German purchaser
became aware of the misuse when shoes built to its specifications and bearing
its trademark appeared at a trade show. The court implied the notions of
exclusivity and confidentiality into the contract and thereby permitted the
German company to void its purchase contract with the Italian manufacturer.
The court held that the use of the purchaser's specifications was a
misappropriation that constituted a breach under article 25 of the CISG.
3 21
This case illustrates the informality of most sale of goods transactions. Despite
the paramount importance of trademark and confidentiality, the parties failed
to formalize specific contract language to protect the buyer. Nevertheless, the
German court implied the existence of such protections into the agreement.
Professors Beale and Dugdale examined the importance of implied
assumptions in the types of informal contracts consummated "by telephone or
simple exchange of letters."329 They characterized such agreements as ones
in which "only the primary obligations would be planned expressly but the
parties to such contracts held unexpressed assumptions about the way in which
obligations would be adjusted or enforced, relying either upon custom or a
'gentlemen's agreement' with the other contracting party."33 Although the
326. CODICE CIVILE [C.CIV.] art. 12 (Italy 1942).
327. See Journal of Law and Commerce Case 1, 12 J.L. & CoM. 261, 261 (1993) (summarizing facts
and holding and translating text of German appellate case Oberlandesgericht, Frankfurt am Main, 1991-SU
164/90 (Sept. 17, 1991)); see also Volker Behr, Commentary to Journal of Law & Commerce Case L
Oberlandesgericht, Frankfurt am Main, 12 J.L. & CoM. 271 (1993).
328. The CISG defines a fundamental breach as one that "substantially" deprives a party of her
expectations under the contract. See CISG, supra note 9, art. 25. The party is excused if: (1) she did not
foresee the detrimental result and (2) a reasonable person would not have foreseen the result. See id. The
nonbreaching party may then avoid the contract under articles 49 and 64. See id. arts. 49, 64.
329. Hugh Beale & Tony Dugdale, Contracts Between Businessmen: Planning and the Use of
Contractual Remedies, 2 Bur. J.L. & SOC'Y 45, 48 (1975).
330. Id. It can be argued that a "gentlemen's agreement" is merely a different form of a comfort
instrument.
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German court enforced this type of unexpressed assumption, enforceability
would have been better supported through an explicit assurance of
confidentiality.
Similarly, the Municipal Court of Holstein used both the CISG and
German domestic law to fill in a gap in a contract between an Italian clothing
manufacturer and a German retailer.331 The contract provided for a schedule
of delivery dates, stating that the clothes were "autumn goods, to be delivered
July, August, September, plus or minus. "332 The first delivery of the goods
was made on September 26th. The retailer rejected the delivery of the goods
as untimely. In its decision, "[t]he court applied the CISG as the law of the
seller's country but also took into account German domestic law for filling
gaps on questions of performance. "13  The court held for the seller,
reasoning that the delivery was made during the agreed period, although the
delivery may not have been made according to the specifications of the
contract. Such misunderstandings are common due to the problems of
linguistic and cultural differences and the tendency of business persons to
prefer brevity in their business communiqus .334 The danger of such
misunderstandings is compounded in the area of international comfort
instruments. Differences in language, culture, and legal systems are coupled
with the intentional use of vague language. As a result, the risk of unintended
legal liability is great in these types of transnational communications.
The German importer should have done several things differently to avoid
such a misunderstanding. First, it should have defined the term "autumn
goods" more carefully to ensure timely and qualitatively effective delivery of
the goods. Second, as the German court suggested, the importer should have
made use of the nachf-ist notice provision in the CISG,335 which is found
in article 47 of the CISG.3 16 This additional time to perform is normally
given in conjunction with a fixed and known delivery date. The German court
held that "the buyer did not effectively avoid the contract by refusing
acceptance of the goods without having fixed an additional period in the
331. U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE LAW, CASE LAW ON UNICTRAL TEXTS (CLOUT), 1993,
at 3, U.N. Doc. AICN.9/SER.C/ABSTRACTSI1 [hereinafter CLOUT Case #7] (discussing case in
Amtsgericht Oldenburg in Holstein 5 C 73/89 (Apr. 24, 1990)).
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. A U.S. district court confronted a similar lack of clarity in the infamous "chicken case."
Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.C. Int'l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). At issue was
the meaning of chicken. The English-speaking exporter made a number of deliveries of stewing chickens
to a German-speaking Swiss importer. The importer claimed that the meaning of chicken suggested
delivery of a variety of types, including young broiling chickens. The court rejected the importer's
contention, and absent any relevant trade usage, held in favor of the seller.
335. Of course, the formal notice option provided in the CISG was not available in the 1960
Frigaliment case. The civil law countries, however, have a long history of nachfrist notice (Germany) or
rise en demeur (France).
336. Article 47(1) states that the "buyer may fix an additional period of time of reasonable length
for performance by the seller." CISG, supra note 9, art. 47, para. 1. Article 48(2) allows a seller to
"request" additional time for performance. See id. art. 48, para. 2. The request places an affirmative
obligation on the buyer to respond. If the buyer fails to respond to the request, then the additional time
is deemed to have been granted. The buyer thus loses her right to void the contract during that additional
period of time.
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previous cases of non-delivery.""'7 This decision could support a number of
interpretations. First, the use of nachfrist notice in this situation would have
been evidence that the parties had indeed intended multiple delivery dates
throughout the autumn months. Second, the decision suggests the possibility
that nachfrist notice may be used to fix an unspecified delivery date. At a
minimum, it would place a burden upon the exporter to respond to the request
for delivery. The failure of the exporter to respond would have allowed the
German importer to declare the contract void and to seek substitute goods
elsewhere.338 If an American business person mistakenly regards the
nachfrist letter as an unenforceable comfort instrument, then she may suffer
unexpected liability.
2. The Duty To Inspect and To Notify
A purchaser of goods may reject delivered goods if she gives timely and
effective notice of nonconformity. According to the CISG, the buyer has three
duties that relate to the notice requirement. First, article 38(1) requires the
buyer to inspect the goods "within as short a period as is practicable. 
" 3
Second, the buyer must inform the seller of the lack of conformity "within a
reasonable time after he has discovered it or ought to have discovered it. "340
Specifically, a claim for nonconformity is time-barred if not reported within
two years of delivery to the buyer unless this time limit is inconsistent with
a contractual period of guarantee.34' Third, the notice to the seller must
specify the nature of the nonconformity.342
A German court recently addressed one aspect of the CISG's notice
requirements. Pursuant to an installment contract, a German clothing retailer
gave notice to an Italian seller of fashion goods eight and twelve days,
respectively, after delivery of two shipments.343 The buyer stated that the
goods failed to conform because of poor workmanship and improper fitting
of the goods. 3" The German court bypassed the issue of timeliness and held
the notice ineffective due to its lack of specificity.
Section 2-605 of the UCC contains a notice provision analogous to the
337. CLOUT Case #7, supra note 331 (emphasis added).
338. CISG, supra note 9, art. 49, para. l(b) (providing that buyer may declare contract avoided "in
the case of non-delivery, if the seller does not deliver goods within the additional period [or fails to
respond to a nachfrist notice] of time fixed by the buyer").
339. Id. art. 38, para. 1. This period is extended if the goods are redirected in transit by the buyer
unless the "seller knew or ought to have known of the possibility of such a redirection." Id. art. 38, para.
3. The UCC similarly provides: "Rejection of goods must be within a reasonable time after their delivery.
It is ineffective unless the buyer seasonably notifies the seller." U.C.C. § 2-602(1) (1994) (emphasis
added).
340. CISG, supra note 9, art. 39, para. 1.
341. See id. art. 39, para. 2.
342. See id. art. 39, para. 1. The period of reasonableness for giving notice and the two year
limitation may be extended if the seller knew or "could not have been unaware" of the nonconformity and
thus failed to disclose the nonconformity to the buyer. See id. art. 40.
343. U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE LAW, CASE LAW ON UNICTRAL TEXTS (CLOUT), 1993,
at 3, U.N. Doe. AICN.91SER.C/ABSTRACTS/1 (May 19, 1993) [hereinafter CLOUT Case #3]
(discussing case in Landgericht Mfinchen I, 17 HKO 3726/89 (July 3, 1984)), reviewed by KRiTZER, supra
note 201, at 4 (Case Commentary: Germany).
344. See CLOUT Case #3, supra note 343.
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one found in the CISG. The specificity required under the Code, however,
seems to be less demanding than that required under the Convention. Under
the Code, the rejecting party at first only needs to state in general terms the
reason for the rejection.145 A comment to the Code explains that under this
section, the buyer is permitted to give a "quick and informal notice of defects
in a tender without penalizing him for omissions in his statement. "346 There
is at least one exception, however, to the general character of the notice
requirement: "Where the defect in a tender is one which could have been
cured by the seller, a buyer who merely rejects the delivery without stating
his objections to it is probably acting in commercial bad faith . . . ."I This
clarification indicates that a general notice, rather than a particularized one,
is sufficient to satisfy the dictates of the Code. Under the Code, the seller
may, however, make a formal" request in writing for a more particularized
listing of the defects on which the buyer proposes to rely in making her
rejection.3 4 The German court's determination that "poor workmanship and
improper fit"3 49 was not specific enough may lead to the conclusion that the
degree of specificity required under the Convention is greater than that
required under the UCC. This ambiguous language of notice can be
analogized to the type of language found in most comfort instruments. The
writer of a comfort letter protects herself from liability through the vagueness
of her letter. However, the writer's vagueness in a notification of
nonconformity prevents her from exercising her right of rejection and
associated warranty claims.
C. The Presumption of Enforceability
Both the general principles supporting comfort instrument enforceability
and recent case law indicate that a clear presumption of nonenforceability no
longer exists. This is especially true in light of the fact that the
Anglo-American presumption of nonenforceability has no direct application
under the CISG. The CISG itself places comfort instrument enforceability
issues at ground zero. The enforceability of comfort instruments is still to be
determined by future courts interpreting the CISG.
Two factors lead to the conclusion that, through the evolution of CISG
jurisprudence, comfort instruments may extend contractual liability. First,
recent court cases, especially in England, have challenged the monolithic
notion of per se nonenforceability. The lower court in Kleinwort Benson,3S0
along with the subsequent decision in Bank of New Zealand v. Ginivan,35t
have provided glimpses into the potential enforceability of these instruments
345. See U.C.C. § 2-605 (1996).
346. Id. § 2-605 cmt. 1.
347. Id. § 2-605 cmt. 2.
348. See id. § 2-605(1)(b).
349. See CLOUT Case #3, supra note 343.
350. [1988] 1 W.L.R. 799 (Q.B. 1987). For a discussion of the Kleinwort Benson case, see supra
text accompanying notes 38-42.
351. [1991] 1 N.Z.L.R. 178, 180 (C.A. 1990). For an examination of this case, see supra text
accompanying notes 43-47.
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on the basis of the twin pillars of contract-promissorial and reliance-based
theories. A more accurate rendition of Anglo-American jurisprudence would
hold that such instruments may be enforceable given the appropriate fact
pattern. An instrument detailed in its assurances and resulting in reasonable
reliance will result in contractual liability.
Second, the Italian shoe cases and civil law jurisprudence in general show
that a greater degree of informality will be permitted under the CISG as
interpreted by civil law courts. The fewer the legal requirements for
contractual formality, the greater the possibility for unintended liability in the
issuance of a. comfort instrument. Although the enforceability of comfort
instruments has not been authoritatively determined within any of the world's
legal systems, the civil law countries' teleological and purpose-oriented
jurisprudence weighs against any formalistic per se rule of nonenforceability.
The French notion of obligations de faire52  and Germany's
Patronatserkldirungen353 indicate that the presumption is generally in favor
of the enforceability of such instruments.
V. THE EVOLVING JURISPRUDENCE OF THE CISG AND COMFORT
INSTRUMENT ENFORCEABILITY
A. CISG Treatment of Comfort Letters
The CISG does not deal directly with the issue of comfort instrument
enforceability. Whether comfort instruments are enforceable will be
determined by the CISG's general articles defining what is and is not a
contract. The CISG's lack of both a writing requirement and a parol evidence
rule gives the receiver of a comfort instrument a strategic advantage in
proving enforceability. Contemporaneous oral assurances as to the legality of
the instrument may be admitted into evidence to prove the issuer's intent to
be bound. Moreover, evidence of the depth of negotiations over the wording
of the instrument and the importance attached to it by the parties will help
support a claim of justifiable reliance. Ultimately, the vagueness and breadth
of the CISG's contract formation and remedial provisions will leave the
determination of enforceability to future court cases. Because of the different
approaches of the common and civil law, the future enforceability of comfort
instruments is likely to depend on which courts are called upon to render a
decision in a case of first impression.
It is likely that civil law courts will hold a party contractually liable for
issuing a comfort instrument. Assuming that the case is a strong one for
enforceability,"M national jurisprudence and the CISG may lead other courts
down the path to finding contractual liability. The civil law countries' less
formal requirements for finding contractual liability,355 coupled with the
352. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
353. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
354. A strong case would be one involving a letter containing detailed assurances and inducing
reliance.
355. See supra Subsection ll.A.2.
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CISG's liberal evidentiary requirements, may predispose civil law courts to
enforce such instruments. Once such a precedent for enforceability is in place,
it will be difficult for U.S. courts to avoid similar decisions.
A number of factors militate in favor of such uniform decisionmaking. A
comparison of the CISG with the history of the UCC illustrates similar
elements favoring uniformity of application. These factors include "a common
substantive law, a codified mandate of uniformity, and case law that will be
readily accessible. "356
B. The Future Relevance of the CISG to International Contract Law and
Comfort Instruments
The CISG provides a greater likelihood of comfort instrument
enforceability than does U.S. case law alone. The liberal evidentiary
requirements of the CISG, along with foreign national laws that do not
support per se nonenforceability, create fertile ground for a finding of
enforceability in a foreign court applying the CISG. For the sake of
uniformity, U.S. courts will be compelled to give great deference to these
foreign precedents. These two factors-the CISG evidentiary requirements and
the importance of foreign precedents-bode well for the future enforceability
of comfort instruments.
1. Evidentiary Requirements
For the American business person, the level of evidence needed to meet
the threshold of agreement under the CISG has made international contracting
a riskier endeavor. The writing requirement of the UCC eliminates liability
for oral agreements and "informal" letter agreements. The writing must be
"sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made ... and [must
be] signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought."357 There are
exceptions, however, in the UCC to the rigid application of its statute of
frauds and parol evidence provisions. Under the written confirmation rule, for
example, the writing may be a one-sided instrument.35 A merchant may
legally confirm an oral agreement in writing. If the receiving party fails to
respond with a written notice of objection, then she is taken to have waived
her statute of frauds defense. It should be noted that this forced waiver does
not shift the burden of proof as to whether there was in fact a legal contract
of sale. The confirming party still has the "burden of persuading the trier of
fact that a contract was in fact made orally prior to the written
confirmation. " "' Other exceptions to the writing requirement can be found
in cases involving specially manufactured goods3" and where one party has
partially performed. 6' The former situation estops a purchaser from
356. Cook, supra note 183, at 233.
357. U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (1989).
358. See id. § 2-201(2).
359. Id. § 2-201 cmt. 3.
360. See id. § 2-201(3)(a).
361. See id. § 2-201(3)(c).
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canceling an order for specialty goods if her notice of repudiation fails to
reach the seller before "a substantial beginning of their manufacture or
commitments for their procurement" 2 have been made. In the case of an
installment contract, receipt and acceptance of delivery "constitutes an
unambiguous overt admission by both parties that a contract actually
exists. "
3 63
In contrast, the CISG's evidentiary threshold is easier to meet for two
reasons. First, a purely oral agreement or one evidenced by informal
correspondence or comfort instruments is sufficient to evidence the formation
of a contract. Second, contractual obligations "may be proved by any
means," 3" which would include a prior agreement or a contemporaneous
oral agreement. A decision rendered by the Mexican Commission for the
Protection of Foreign Trade, for example, cited article 11 of the CISG in
holding that a number of commercial invoices and evidence of the delivery of
the goods were sufficient to support a finding of a contract of sale.365 The
informality, both in form and substance, of most comfort instruments is not
as meaningful under the CISG as it is under U.S. jurisprudence.
2. Uniformity of Decision
The overall success of the CISG depends on the creation of a uniform
interpretive jurisprudence. The uniformity of decision mandated by the CISG
requires U.S. courts to apply foreign decisions over conflicting domestic
decisions regarding the enforceability of comfort instruments: "[The
Convention, by its language and history, directs United States courts to
achieve uniformity in interpretation by granting considerable weight to foreign
decisions interpreting its terms. "366 The ability to determine comfort
instrument enforceability will thus depend on which courts decide cases of
first impression pertaining to comfort instruments and the CISG. The need for
uniformity in the interpretation and application of the CISG will be a
compelling factor in most future CISG cases.
The experience of U.S. courts with the creation of a relatively uniform
jurisprudence around the UCC should strengthen their resolve to create a
similar jurisprudence for the CISG. The need for predictability and uniformity
may place comfort instrument enforceability on two tracks. One track involves
domestic cases that currently recognize the nonenforceability of most comfort
instruments. The other involves the importation of foreign case law through
the CISG. The needs of commercial predictability and certainty will best be
served by a convergence of the two tracks over time. For the short term, the
American business person will have to maneuver within a more complicated
contractual landscape. The next section will make recommendations based on
some of the major differences between the UCC and the CISG. These
recommendations will help the American business person avoid unintended
362. Id. § 2-201(3)(a).
363. Id. § 2-201 cmt. 2.
364. CISG, supra note 9, art. 11.
365. See KRrrzER, supra note 9, at 3.
366. Cook, supra note 183, at 199.
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contractual liability.
C. Recommendations for the American Business Person
This Article has touched upon a number of the philosophical and practical
differences in the law of contracts among the world's different legal systems
and the CISG. The American business person and her attorney should be
cognizant of several of these differences when negotiating and drafting
international sales contracts and comfort instruments .367 First, they should
be aware that the CISG's definition of materiality is unusually broad. The
CISG's agreement-finding language is a facade for the strict compliance
dictates of the early common law's mirror image rule. An American business
person's skill at formulating contracts out of loosely and sparsely worded
correspondence is likely to result in uncertainty of obligation under the CISG.
In such situations, the CISG rejects the battle of the forms resolution found
in U.S. law in favor of a finding of noncontract. The acceptance must be the
mirror image of the offer in all material terms. Second, the ability to "agree
to agree" on a price is expressly abrogated under the CISG.368 A contract
can only be formed if there is a mutual agreement on price or a means of
calculating the price at the time of formation. Third, the implication of trade
usage is sanctioned under both the UCC and the CISG, but there are notable
differences. The UCC simply recognizes that all "applicable usage[s] of trade
in the place where any part of [the] performance is to occur shall be used [as
aids] in interpreting the agreement."369 The implication of trade usage under
the CISG has a higher evidentiary threshold. It requires a further finding that
the party to be charged had actual or imputed knowledge of the particular
trade usage.
3 70
The fourth aspect of the CISG that American business persons should be
aware of is its disregard for the writing requirement found in the common
law. Whether a letter is a fully or partially integrated instrument will not play
as meaningful a role under the CISG.3 71 The common law makes a
distinction between fully and partially integrated instruments. Those that are
construed to be partial would admit the types of evidence that are allowed
under the Convention. When an instrument is considered to be fully
integrated, however, there is a pronounced divergence between the CISG and
the common law. The CISG's lack of a writing requirement allows all
relevant information into evidence even if it contradicts the written
367. See generally Burte A. Leete, Contract Formation Under the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods and the Uniform Commercial Code: Pitfalls for the Unwary,
6 TEMP. INT'L & CoMp. L.J. 193 (1992) (discussing creation of Uniform Law on the Formation of
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods and Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods to
Establish Uniformity in International Business Transactions).
368. In contrast, the UCC expressly condones the notion of an open price term: "The parties if they
so intend can conclude a contract for sale even though the price is not settled." U.C.C. § 2-305(1) (1981).
369. Id. § 1-205(5).
370. See CISG, supra note 9, art. 9.
371. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 212, 214 (1981) (discussing American legal
treatment of integrated instruments). For a general discussion of the notion of integration, see NASSAR,
supra note 84, at 41.
CISG and the Presumption of Enforceability
documentation. In contrast, the common law parol evidence rule would
prohibit the introduction of evidence that would contradict the terms of the
writing.372 This would be a paramount factor in the area of comfort
instrument enforceability.373
The fifth aspect of the CISG that merits attention is that, under it, the
American business person will find it more difficult to be the master of her
offers. Except for the firm offer rule,374 the UCC presumes that all offers
are revocable. Article 16 of the Convention, in contrast, precludes revocation
if "it was reasonable for the offeree to rely on the offer."" "Thus, an offer
stating that acceptance must be made 'within thirty days' would be considered
irrevocable for that period."376 The other material difference is that a firm
offer under the UCC must be in written form. The lack of a statute of frauds
requirement under the CISG, however, allows an oral assurance to be
irrevocable. Thus, a comfort letter pertaining to an offer is more likely to be
enforced under the CISG than under the UCC.
VI. CONCLUSION
The enforceability of informal instruments of commerce, or comfort
instruments, is quite possible in international contracts law. Generally
accepted principles of contract law may be applied to determine "what is fair
and equitable ... in terms of what best serves the business efficiency of the
relationship."377 Many general principles are articulated in the CISG, which
has been described as "a giant step forward from the eras of conflicts [of law]
and the law of merchants."378 The Convention, however, has added another
area of legal concern for practitioners of private international transactional law
and their clients. Along with knowledge of the UCC, foreign national laws,
and international trade usage, the Convention and its reach are important
considerations for anyone involved in the international sale of goods. From
372. See, e.g., I.M.A., Inc. v. Rocky Mountain Airways, Inc., 713 P.2d 882, 888 n.6 (Colo. 1986);
see also Buckley Bros. Motors, Inc. v. Gran Prix Imports, Inc., 633 P.2d 1081, 1083 (Colo. 1981).
373. The court in Beijing Metals & Minerals v. American Business Center, Inc. held that the parol
evidence rule would still apply in U.S. courts under the CISG when there is a written instrument. The
court made only passing reference to the CISG, stating that "there is as yet virtually no case law
interpreting the Sales of Goods Convention." 993 F.2d 1178, 1182-83 n.9 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting Filanto
S.p.A. v. Chilewich Int'l Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1129, 1237 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)). The court assumed that the
parol evidence rule goes to the validity of the contract, which requires the application of internal law. "We
need not resolve this choice of law rule, because our discussion is limited to application of the parol
evidence rule which applies regardless." Id. (emphasis added). Based upon this determination, the court
disregarded two oral agreements made contemporaneously with a written payment agreement. It concluded
that the written agreement "[was] unambiguous ... and that nothing in its four comers, or in the
surrounding circumstances, indicates the existence of collateral contingent agreements .... [Tihe parol
evidence rule bars enforcement of prior or contemporaneous agreements to vary ... terms of a fully
integrated written instrument." Id. at 1182.
374. Section 2-205 allows for the irrevocability of an offer if it is "in a signed writing" and limits
the period of irrevocability to no more than three months.
375. CISG, supra note 9, art. 16, para. 3(b). This provision also requires actual reliance on the part
of the offeree.
376. 1 GUIDE TO THE CISG, supra note 173, at 101.021.
377. NAssAR, supra note 84, at 191.
378. Randall & Norris, supra note 1, at 619.
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a practical point of view, "prudent drafters [of international sales contracts
and comfort instruments] ought to re-examine language to protect the special
needs of their clients. "379
The interrelationship between the potential enforceability of comfort
instruments and the application of the CISG may ultimately be secondary to
the general advance of contractual liability into this area. The commonality of
contract rules among the world's different legal systems attests to the fact that
there has been a process of convergence taking place over the centuries. The
conduit for this convergence has been the expansion of international business
transactions and trade. As comfort instruments become more detailed and
contractual in nature, the likelihood of enforceability increases. The
Convention's flexible terminology is unlikely to present an obstacle to the
enforcement of these instruments within the context of international business
transactions.
379. E. Allan Farnsworth, Review of Standard Forms or Terms Under the Wenna Convention, 21
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 439, 447 (1988). Professor Farnsworth recognized a tripartite hierarchy in
international contract law. At the top is domestic law as regards the inherent validity of the contract,
followed by the contract itself, and at the bottom, the Convention.
